The Nature of a Buddhist Path

Abstract

Is there a “common element” in Buddhist ethical thought from which one might rationally reconstruct a Buddhist normative ethical theory? Many construe this as the question Which contemporary normative theory does Buddhist ethics best approximate: consequentialism or virtue ethics? This essay argues that two distinct evaluative relations underlie these positions: an instrumental and a constitutive analysis. This chapter raises some difficulties for linking these distinct analyses to particular normative ethical theories but gives reasons to think that both may be justified as meta-ethical grounds for rationally reconstructing Buddhist thought as an ethical theory. It closes with some reflections on the complexity involved in trying to establish a single and homogeneous position on the nature of Buddhist ethics.

Karma, Moral Responsibility, and Buddhist Ethics

“…Mādhyamikas argue that it is not. The positive upshot of this refutation, however, is unclear (Tillemans 2016, Finnigan 2017a. Contemporary scholars treat Mādhyamikas as holding that there is no ultimate reality, there is no ultimately true reductive base for an analysis of persons, but that 'our conventional or customary standards of rational acceptance are the only game in town' (Siderits 1989: 238).…”

“…However, contemporary work increasingly emphasizes enactive interpretations of conscious experience according to which interests, values, intentions, and habituated dispositions inform both what the subject experiences and the ways in which experienced objects solicit behavioural response (Mackenzie 2013;Ganeri 2017). Intentional attitudes such as anger, fear, or jealousy might be said to exemplify this idea if understood as adopted stances which both inform how an object (person or situation) is experienced and implicate modes of behavioural response (Finnigan 2017a;2019, 2021. Such a view might also help explain why the Buddha and later historical Buddhists considered the (otherwise mere) possession and encouragement of these intentional attitudes to be forms of mental activity that accrue karmic merit or demerit.…”

Confronting suffering with narrative theory, constructed selfhood, and control: Critical perspectives by Simone Weil and Buddhist metaphysics

“…Second, efforts to locate meaning in suffering may misguide. Instead of theoretical sense making, one is to engage in experiential, bodily practice, which consists of, for instance, concentrating on one's breathing in sitting meditation (Finnigan, 2017;Wirth, 2016). 21 Zen Buddhism goes "beneath and beyond thinking" (Wirth, 2016, p. 8) by returning to the body, focus on which may lead to forms of awareness that come before cognitive states.…”

“…17. Buddhism emphasizes four immeasurables, which are lovingkindness, compassion, empathetic joy, and equanimity (Finnigan 2017). All of these are entwined with moral regard for others.…”

Buddhism and animal ethics

“…Alternatively, one might argue that compassion, itself, has intrinsic value and is justified as one of several mutually reinforcing constituents of the awakened way of living circumscribed by the Eightfold Path. When sufficiently cultivated, compassion is robustly dispositional in the sense of reliably manifesting in nonviolent, ethical conduct ( śīla ), which, in turn, reinforces meditative practices ( samādhi ), which facilitate the cultivation of wisdom ( prajñā ) and which, in turn, serves to hone and enrich compassion's intentional content (Finnigan, ).…”