“…Intuitively, the asymmetric strategies are not consistent with price dispersioñ For particular two-person games, such as the War of Attrition (Hendricks, Weiss and Wilson, 1988), capacity-constrained price setting games (Osborne and Pitchik, 1986a), and price setting with loyal consumers (Narasimhan, 1988), uniqueness has been thoroughly examined. Osborne and Pitchik (1986b) also examine the question of uniqueness in the 3-firm "pure" location model of Hotelling (1929). They show that with a uniform distribution of consumers, in addition to a symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium (sce Shaked, 1982), there is a unique (up to symmetry) asymmetric equilibrium within the class of equilibria in which at least one firm uses a pure strategy.…”