The Nature of Model-World Comparisons

Salis, Fiora

doi:10.1093/monist/onw003

Cited by 21 publications

(11 citation statements)

References 27 publications

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“…On his view, model systems are analogous to maps that allow inferring facts about a certain territory from facts about the map and an interpretation key translating facts about the map into claims about the territory. See Salis (2016) for a critical discussion of this notion in the context of Frigg's fictionalist proposal. imagined properties of model systems and the real properties of targets can only be fictionally identical, or identical within a game of make-believe.…”

Section: Epistemic Condition or Ecmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…SeeSalis (2016) for an extensive discussion of Walton's analysis of fictional discourse and model-world comparisons in relation to the current literature on models as fiction.6 Walton rejects this interpretation for statements involving fictional names (which according to him express no propositions) and appeals instead to an analysis in terms of kinds of pretence.Friend (2011) argues that this is insufficient to distinguish different kinds of pretence that seem to be about different fictional objects. She and Salis (2013) offer an alternative analysis in terms of gappy propositions.…”

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confidence: 99%

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Scientific Discovery Through Fictionally Modelling Reality

Salis

2018

Topoi

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How do scientific models represent in a way that enables us to discover new truths about reality and draw inferences about it? Contemporary accounts of scientific discovery answer this question by focusing on the cognitive mechanisms involved in the generation of new ideas and concepts in terms of a special sort of reasoning-or model-based reasoning-involving imagery. Alternatively, I argue that answering this question requires that we recognise the crucial role of the propositional imagination in the construction and development of models for the purpose of generating hypotheses that are plausible candidates for truth. I propose simple fictionalism as a new account of models as Waltonian games of make-believe and suggest that models can lead to genuine scientific discovery when they are used as representations that denote real world phenomena and generate two main kinds of theoretical hypotheses, model-world comparisons and direct attributions.

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Section: Epistemic Condition or Ecmentioning

confidence: 99%

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Scientific Discovery Through Fictionally Modelling Reality

Salis

2018

Topoi

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“…Moreover, mere structural properties don't do justice to the manipulability and physicality of models in virtue of which they enable such dynamic interactions with modellers themselves (Knuuttila 2011). Finally, Fiora Salis (2016) has recently argued that sophisticated structuralist accounts such as Weisberg's ultimately rely on fictionalist content after all. 4 if she is right, then my arguments should straightforwardly apply in those contexts as well.…”

Section: Fictionalism About Modelsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Salis (2016) provides a fictionalist account of the model-world relationship, but she doesn't discuss, and it isn't clear to me, whether it can manage the problem cases in Section 5.…”

Section: Fictionalism About Modelsmentioning

confidence: 99%

From Models-as-Fictions to Models-as-Tools

Currie¹

2017

Ergo, an Open Access Journal of Philosophy

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Many accounts of scientific modeling conceive of models as fictions: there are analogies between models and various aesthetic objects, as well as between how scientists interact with models and how authors interact with fictions. Fictionalists, like most accounts of models, take models to be revelatory of the actual world in virtue of bearing some resemblance relation to a target system. While such fictionalist accounts capture crucial aspects of modelling practice, they are ill-suited to some design and engineering contexts. Here, models sometimes serve to underwrite design projects whereby real-world targets are constructed. in such circumstances, it is unclear what the model is supposed to resemble. Further, while fictionalists often require that models qua models have their content in virtue of construal or interpretation, in some engineering and design contexts success-conditions do not require such content-all that is required is that the model generates the required outputs. i take these points to motivate a view which accommodates fictionalism, but is broader. i articulate and defend an account of models as tools: specifically, material objects which are put to particular uses in particular contexts.

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“…The quest for finding a plausible combination of fictionalism and realism is by no means forsaken, and the issues of similarity and comparison are in the very centre of philosophical attention (Levy 2012;Purves 2013;Salis 2016;Contessa 2010; Godfrey-Smith 2016; Weisberg 2013 among many others). Therefore, I do not pretend that we could be certain of the failure of the expedition for developing Giere's theory into a sophisticated form of realism.…”

Section: Representation and Realitymentioning

confidence: 99%

On the Thinking Brains and Tinkering with the Scientific Models

Beni

2017

Axiomathes

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The paper aims to provide a detailed assessment of Tim Crane's recent invocation of the notion of scientific models in the way of dealing with the issue of the brain's representational states. In this paper, I assess Crane's proposal under a charitable and a less charitable reading. I argue that Crane's use of scientific models is at best (i.e. under a charitable reading) compatible with his expression of psychological realism. However, Crane's use of model-based strategy by no means underlay, support, or strengthen his psychological realism. Rather, traditional reasons from the metaphysics of mind, acting quite separately from empirical scientific reasons, must be used to support this realism, and Crane has merely removed the threat posed to these metaphysical arguments by the existence of the so-called mereological fallacy in empirical neuroscience. Therefore, while he has saved the neuroscientific language from philosophical attack, he has perhaps even strengthened the divide between neuroscience and philosophy. I conclude the paper by outlining the sketch of a broadbrush scientifically informed strategy for defending psychological realism.

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The Nature of Model-World Comparisons

Abstract: analyses of comparative claims that emerge from the current debate on fiction.

Cited by 21 publications

References 27 publications

Scientific Discovery Through Fictionally Modelling Reality

Scientific Discovery Through Fictionally Modelling Reality

From Models-as-Fictions to Models-as-Tools

On the Thinking Brains and Tinkering with the Scientific Models

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