The Nazi Doctors: Medical Killing and the Psychology of Genocide

Stern, Fritz; Lifton, Robert Jay

doi:10.2307/20043033

Cited by 11 publications

(22 citation statements)

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“…And recognizing that some causally determined physiological processes that ultimately reduce to chemistry and physics resemble a living being is a normative decision we make. Indeed, Lifton's empirical research suggests that the Nazi appropriation of the reductive tendency of biomedicine turned partly on denying that some physiologic processes resemble humans in the first place (e.g., Lifton, 2000, p. 23−44). Given this, a person uttering ‘I am in pain’ is not so much telling a provider how things stand in their ‘inner realm’.…”

Section: The Beginnings Of a Radical Breakmentioning

confidence: 99%

Pain cannot (just) be whatever the person says: A critique of a dogma

Djordjevic

2023

Nursing Philosophy

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McCaffery's definition of pain has proven to be one of the most consequential in nursing and healthcare more generally. She put forward this definition in response to the persistent undertreatment of pain. However, despite raising her definition to the status of a dogma, the undertreatment remains a real problem. This essay explores the contention that McCaffery's definition of pain elides critical aspects of it, aspects that demand consideration when treating pain. In section I, I set the stage. I discuss how McCaffery's definition and her understanding of pain science interrelate. In section II, I raise three problems for this understanding. In section III, I argue that these problems stem from an incoherency in her definition. Finally, in section IV, I draw from hospice nursing as well as philosophy and the social sciences to redefine ‘pain’ so that an intersubjective feature of it is foregrounded. I also briefly discuss one implication this redefinition has for pain management.

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Section: The Beginnings Of a Radical Breakmentioning

confidence: 99%

Pain cannot (just) be whatever the person says: A critique of a dogma

Djordjevic

2023

Nursing Philosophy

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“…Although I sympathize with Lifton's (1986) moral convictions, to me that point of pulling back is precisely where he failed as a social scientist. The example captures the dilemma I noted earlier-the conflict between scientific understanding of evil and moral judgment of it.…”

Section: The Myth Of Pure Evilmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Our initial tendency is to view the perpetrators of evil through the lens of this myth and to assimilate their actions to it. In a revealing passage in The Nazi Doctors, psychiatrist Robert Jay Lifton (1986) remarked that when interviewing some of these men, he occasionally began to see the world and the events as the men themselves had seen them and then felt some sympathy toward them. At that point, Lifton said, he always pulled back and reminded himself that this person was an evil monster, not a decent human being like the rest of us.…”

Section: The Myth Of Pure Evilmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Human evil: The myth of pure evil and the true causes of violence.

Baumeister¹

2012

The Social Psychology of Morality: Exploring the Causes of Good and Evil.

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Why is there evil? This question has captured the interest of scholars of diverse specialties and backgrounds for centuries. The methods of answering it and the answers themselves have similarly reflected this diversity. My approach is that of a social scientist. The methods and research findings of social scientists can be brought to bear on what for others has been a legal, practical, theological, philosophical, or other kind of problem.One obstacle for the social scientist is the conflict between the inherent immorality of the topic and the professional scientist's goal of unbiased neutrality. Social scientists are not supposed to let their values cloud their judgment, because doing so can impede the impartial search for truth. But can we view the crimes of Hitler and his minions with the same dispassionate and nonjudgmental attitude with which we observe the bar pressing of rats in a Skinner box?When doing research for my book on evil (Baumeister, 1997), I was struck by how routinely other social scientists rushed to assert that this was not really a problem. To understand is not to forgive, they insisted. Yet I was not so sure. Indeed, my own work pointed toward different conclusions. In particular, as we understand the perpetrators' inner processes and attitudes, we come to see their crimes as considerably less heinous than how others judge them. Most people

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“…We can regard these processes as having negative moral consequences or as being inherently immoral. Over time, some bystanders join the perpetrators (Lifton, 1986).…”

Section: Psychology and Morality In Genocide And Violent Conflictmentioning

confidence: 99%

Psychology and morality in genocide and violent conflict: Perpetrators, passive bystanders, and rescuers.

Staub¹

2012

The Social Psychology of Morality: Exploring the Causes of Good and Evil.

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In this chapter, I consider the roles of psychology and morality in genocide and in intense violence and mass killing. The starting point for both can be either difficult social conditions in a society or conflict between groups. But psychology and individual-level morality have central roles. Even though there are many societal, cultural, and institutional forces at work, the proximal influences leading to genocide or mass killing are psychological. As the participants undergo a grim evolution, progressing along a "continuum of destruction" (Staub, 1989), moved by psychological and social forces, moral principles and orientations can be subverted. As people respond to these forces, they may engage in profoundly immoral actions without even struggling with the immorality of their thoughts, feelings, and actions. How psychological forces can overwhelm or subvert moral principles and emotions is the primary focus of this chapter. I consider the psychology and morality of perpetrators, passive bystanders, and active bystanders who endanger themselves as they attempt to save lives.I define morality as principles, values, emotional orientations, and practices that maintain or promote human welfare (see also Chapters 13 and 14, this volume, for similar definitions). With the increasing awareness of our

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The Nazi Doctors: Medical Killing and the Psychology of Genocide

Cited by 11 publications

References 0 publications

Pain cannot (just) be whatever the person says: A critique of a dogma

Pain cannot (just) be whatever the person says: A critique of a dogma

Human evil: The myth of pure evil and the true causes of violence.

Psychology and morality in genocide and violent conflict: Perpetrators, passive bystanders, and rescuers.

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