The Need for Influence Theory and Actor-Specific Behavioral Models of Adversaries

Abstract

This article discusses problems of employing deterrence and coercive diplomacy in intra-state conflicts, drawing on those aspects of experience with these strategies during the Cold War relevant for dealing with intra-state conflicts, and adding some reflections on problems of employing these strategies in the post-Cold War environment. The special characteristics of intra-state conflicts, identified in this analysis, call attention to the need for several types of indirect deterrence and coercive diplomacy. Emphasis is placed on including deterrence and coercive diplomacy within a broader influence framework that considers the utility and sometimes the necessity for coupling these strategies with positive initiatives. This article outlines a basic requirement for effective use of these strategies, namely the need to replace the simplistic assumption that adversaries are "rational, unitary" actors with more specific "actorspecific behavioral models" essential for understanding and attempting to influence different adversaries.This analysis begins with a discussion of problems of employing deterrence and coercive diplomacy in intra-state conflicts, drawing on those aspects of experience with these strategies during the Cold War relevant for dealing with intra-state conflicts, and adding some reflections on problems of employing these strategies in the post-Cold War environment.The special characteristics of intra-state conflicts, identified in this analysis, call attention to the need for several types of indirect deterrence and coercive diplomacy. Emphasis is placed on including deterrence and coercive diplomacy within a broader influence framework that considers the utility and sometimes the necessity for coupling these strategies with positive initiatives.Influence theory also requires that consideration be given to the role of reassurances to adversaries under several well-defined circumstances. An influence framework must also consider the possible utility of a strategy of conciliation (a term preferable to the discredited concept of appeasement). Similarly, the concept of influence theory also includes the strategy of conditional reciprocity, which limits risks of conciliatory efforts and which, also, can be employed in pursuing the ambitious long-range objective of re-socializing "rogue" leaders and "outlaw" states.Attention is given in this analysis also to the problem of dealing with "spoilers" in intra-state conflicts, those who complicate or attempt to defeat efforts by mediators to end such struggles. The efforts of mediators will be facilitated if they distinguish between different types of spoilers and devise strategies appropriate for dealing with each type. This is followed with a discussion of a basic requirement for effective use The author would like to thank Barry Schneider and Brad Roberts for their comments on an earlier draft. This article also appeared in

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