The neurological dynamics of the imagination

Abstract

This article examines the imagination by way of various studies in cognitive science. It opens by examining the neural correlates of bodily metaphors. It assumes a basic knowledge of metaphor studies, or the primary finding that has emerged from this field: that large swathes of human conceptualization are structured by bodily relations. I examine the neural correlates of metaphor, concentrating on the relation between the sensory motor cortices and linguistic conceptualization. This discussion, however, leaves many questions unanswered. If it is the case that the sensory motor cortices are appropriated in language acquisition, how does this process occur at the neural level? What neural preconditions exist such that this appropriation is possible? It is with these questions in mind that I will turn my attention to studies of neural plasticity, degeneracy and the mirror neuron activation. Whereas some scholarship in philosophy and cognitive neuroscience has aimed to identify the neurological correlates of consciousness, examining plasticity, degeneracy and activation shifts the discussion away from a study of correlates toward an exploration of the neurological dynamics of thought. This shift seems appropriate if we are to examine the processes of the "imagination."

Between emotion, imagination and cognition: Play as a hybrid neuro-evolutionary concept in bridging Saussure, Hegel and Alexander von Humboldt

“…Th e presumed diff erence between Hegel and Humboldt -the former appears to have excluded nature from his inquiry while the latter regarded it as his major object of study -not only exemplifi es the kernel issue, but also appears highly enlightening today when considered in the context of empirical brain research. Neuropsychologists who aspire to draw new insights from empirical data have reinterpreted the relationships between our capacities: (1) our perception and creation of the visual arts are not necessarily dependent on the neural pathway of using languages (Zaidel 2010); (2) our neural functions are observed as a fl exible system that is adaptable to various situations (Damasio 1999;Kaag 2009). Th ese new insights provide the framework within which our perception is seen as governed and enhanced by the interplay between our consciousness, emotion and cognition (Pessoa 2008).…”

The dual essence of pleasure: Willing, imagining and planning the Saussurean sublime and beautiful in surviving daunting nature and culture

“…The hypothesis of a mirror system has been put forward in order to explain how our evolutionary, developmental, and experiential processes function together within a certain time span of observing, imagining and emulating (Kaag 2009). The mirror neurons, which were first found in macaque monkeys' brain area for hand control, may play a significant role in governing the coordination between our sensing and knowing, hearing and speaking, watching and performing tasks (Donald 2001;Arbib 2012).…”

“…The system as a whole may facilitate our foreseeing of possibilities or potential developments before we decide to take action. At the starting point of observing any kind of situation in nature and culture, patterns of our neural circuits of perceiving and imagining are not very different; rather, they are almost blended and they collaborate to create perspectives for further applications (O'Connor, Aardema 2005;Gallagher 2006;Kaag 2009;Lenzi et al 2009). After taking action to explore a situation, we become more or less removed from our initial position.…”

“…After taking action to explore a situation, we become more or less removed from our initial position. Our mind and behaviour are reshaped or restructured by details found in this situation: both engaging intricacies and foreboding signs may trigger a remapping of neural patterns in our brain (Kaag 2009). …”

“…However, the mirror system does not appear to be careful or precise in terms of judging and choosing, so that in certain cases it may simply react without enabling us to think twice. It becomes equally charged whether we simply imagine doing something, watch others carrying it out, or perform it on our own (Gallagher 2006;Kaag 2009). Given such an obscure relationship between our actions and intentions, we would need to consider some lapses of trials and errors, certain forms of pretending and deceiving, if we count on this system as the sole basis of justifying our behaviour.…”