The New Deal Court: Emergence of a New Reason

Hulsebosch, Daniel J.

doi:10.2307/1122771

Cited by 2 publications

(3 citation statements)

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“…For instance, the coefficient 'Elite' should now be interpreted as the Elite differential for Court of Appeal vacancies generated as a result of a retirement during the baseline period. The statistically insignificant 23 There is one caveat: the identity of the Lord Chancellor did change in June 2003. However, recall from Table 3 that connectivity to the Heads of Division determines a candidate chances of promotion, while connectivity to the Lord Chancellor plays no role.…”

Section: Empirical Strategy and Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In particular, the same Heads of Division − a group that we will call the 'Heads at Announcement' − had been in charge since July 2000 and remained in their posts until after the reform passed into law in March 2005. 23 …”

Section: Did Senior Judges Change Behaviour In the Face Of Reform?mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…tenured) employment. Maskin and Tirole (2004), for instance, contrast an official who must stand for re-election −a "politician"− with a tenured official who, as a result of his job security, pays no As with predictions from political agency models, empirical evidence in this area is sorely lacking (Besley 2006), and even the traditional interpretation of Justice Roberts' change of heart has been questioned (Hulsebosch 1990, Shea 2005. The objective of this paper is to fill this gap.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Are tenured judges insulated from political pressure?

Vidal¹,

Leaver²

2011

Journal of Public Economics

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Tenured public officials such as judges are often thought to be insulated from political pressure and, as a result, indifferent to the concerns of the electorate. We investigate this proposition empirically using data on promotion decisions taken by senior English judges between 1985 and 2005. Throughout this period the popular view was one of ill-disciplined elitism: senior judges were alleged to be favouring candidates from elite backgrounds over their equally capable nonelite counterparts. We find evidence in support of this view to be surprisingly weak; most of the unconditional difference in promotion prospects between the two groups can simply be explained by differences in promotion-relevant characteristics. We then exploit an unexpected proposal to remove control over promotions from the judiciary and find that judges' behaviour dramatically changed. When faced by the prospect of losing autonomy, senior judges began to favour non-elite candidates, as well as candidates who were unconnected to members of the promotion committee. * We thank Oriana Bandiera, Pablo Casas-Arce, Daniel Ferreira, Paul Klemperer, Ignacio Palacios-Huerta, Howard Smith, Kathy Spier, John Vickers, various seminar audiences and, in particular, the Editor and two anonymous referees for their helpful comments and suggestions. We are also grateful to Baroness Hale, Kate Malleson, Lord Justice Maurice Kay, the Commission for Judicial Appointments, Her Majesty's Courts Service and the Ministry of Justice for many useful conversations. All errors are our own.

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Section: Empirical Strategy and Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Did Senior Judges Change Behaviour In the Face Of Reform?mentioning

confidence: 99%