The New Export Routes and Gazprom’s Strategic Opportunities in Europe

The Russo-European Gas Trade and the Position of Southeast Europe between the Great Actors: Neo-imperialism, Conflict–Cooperation Perpetuum, and Soft Balancing

“…Russia's initial criticism against the terminal could be better understood considering Gazprom's broader European plans to build new pipelines to Europe. All of Gazprom's plans, whether realised, failed or in the implementation phase, show that the Russian gas network to Europe will be over capacitated, and thus unprofitable for a while (Vavilov -Kovalishina -Trofimov 2015). One of the reasons why Russia insisted so much on construction is, according to Vavilov, Kovalishina and Trofimov (2015: 191-192), a 'preemptive move' by which Gazprom tries to prevent the competition from building gas pipelines and supplying Europe with gas from its production or at least from its supply routes.…”

Disputes Over the Pipelines Importing Russian Gas to the EU: How to Ensure Consistency in EU Energy Law and Policy?

“…the President of a German authority that granted the 2016 OPAL Exemption) and the German government (which now supports, before the General Court, the 2016 EC OPAL Decision and the 2016 OPAL Exemption, and also supports the construction of Nord Stream 2 pipeline) -see this letter of Jochen Homann, President of BNetzA, available at: http://en.euractiv.eu/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/2017/03/German-regulator-on-Nord-Stream-2.pdf. 44 The 2016 OPAL Exemption was granted at the request of the operator of OPAL, which is a subsidiary of Gazprom. Furthermore, in proceedings concerning the 2016 OPAL Exemption, now pending before the General Court, the legal position of OPAL's operator and the EC (which accepted the 2016 OPAL Exemption) is supported by the German government -see case…”

“…Third, the legal dispute concerning that regulatory exemption is a battleground between these two economic and geopolitical models, and thus a particularly useful way to understand how they clash.In light of the above, it is wholly unsurprising that the proponents of both models above adopt predictable and defined positions with regard to the Nord Stream 2 and OPAL legal disputes, justifying their position using precisely the legal arguments one would expect. The proponents of the first model (Overcapacity and Exemption-Based), including Russia, undertakings belonging to Gazprom group, officials in Germany42 and some interested gas undertakings in the EU, contend that the TEP does not apply to Nord Stream 2 (or Nord Stream)43 and that the 2016 OPAL Exemption fully complies with Article 36 of Directive 2009/73/EC 44. In contrast, the advocates of the second model (Optimal Capacity and Regulatory-Based), especially political groups and economic organisations in the EEC countries, argue that the TEP already applies in full to the Nord Stream 2 pipeline, including its offshore section.…”