1995
DOI: 10.1179/hrge.1.1.276042718403jh80
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The New Gene Technology and the Difference Between Getting Rid of Illness and Altering People

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Cited by 3 publications
(3 citation statements)
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“…Work in this latter area is essential (Shapiro, 1994). In that connection, there is a fundamental difference between using genetic information to get rid of illness and altering people to promote desired (or get rid of undesired) personal characteristics (Sutton, 1995).…”
Section: Prenatal Screeningmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Work in this latter area is essential (Shapiro, 1994). In that connection, there is a fundamental difference between using genetic information to get rid of illness and altering people to promote desired (or get rid of undesired) personal characteristics (Sutton, 1995).…”
Section: Prenatal Screeningmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Some authors advocate genetic enhancement for reasons of parental autonomy (Robertson, 2003), beneficence (Savulescu, 2001;Stock, 2002) or justice (Holtug, 1999). Others oppose it for reasons of justice (Wenz, 2005), because it is eugenic (King, 1999), or because it objectifies people (Sutton, 1995). The respondents in the present study were certainly unaware of the convoluted arguments championed by professional bioethicists, but they made the same distinction between disease prevention and the making of better people.…”
Section: The Treatment-enhancement Distinctionmentioning
confidence: 78%
“…Part of this discourse involved appeals to gene therapies and treatments (Bell 1998), but prenatal genetic diagnosis was also lauded as a way of eliminating 'dreadful diseases' that 'plague human existence', or 'consumes the carriers identity' (Watson 1990; see also Shakespeare in this issue). An important feature of this discourse was the tendency to dissociate the elimination of disease from the elimination of people with the disease (Pembrey 1998, Wald et al 1992, and see Sutton 1995). Overall, there was little reflection about the social aspects of disease definition and the social (as opposed to medical) problems of disability.…”
Section: Notes On Scientific and Clinical Discoursesmentioning
confidence: 99%