The new politics of the new trade: the political economy of intra-industry trade

Madeira, Mary Anne

doi:10.4337/9781781954997.00011

Cited by 7 publications

(6 citation statements)

References 112 publications

(151 reference statements)

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“…For survey and other evidence that firm rather than industry characteristics drive firm preferences over trade liberalization, see Plouffe 2012. For similar evidence on lobbying behaviors, see Madeira 2014;and Osgood 2017a, b. foreign industry. 24 I therefore re-examine the argument that product differentiation moderates the impact of comparative advantage on support for trade.…”

Section: Direct Import and Export Competitionmentioning

confidence: 93%

Globalizing the Supply Chain: Firm and Industrial Support for US Trade Agreements

Osgood¹

2018

Int Org

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From 1960 to 2000, manufacturing supply chains became global. To what extent has this growth in offshore outsourcing and foreign direct investment affected industrial attitudes toward trade liberalization? Using data on public positions of US firms and trade associations on all free trade agreements since 1990, I show that foreign direct investment (FDI) and input sourcing are the primary drivers of support for trade liberalization. Direct import competition and export opportunities play a secondary role in shaping support for free trade agreements. This work therefore adds to the literature on the politics of globalization by providing systematic evidence of a link between global supply chains and industrial preferences, and by developing a new model of the determinants of industrial attitudes toward trade.

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Section: Direct Import and Export Competitionmentioning

confidence: 93%

Globalizing the Supply Chain: Firm and Industrial Support for US Trade Agreements

Osgood¹

2018

Int Org

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“…A complete discussion of the model is provided in the original paper and in Appendix A, which demonstrates how to derive all of the model solutions for the case of a tariff. 5 All of the results on distributional 2 For empirical evidence and discussion of intra-industry divisions, see Gulotty (2014), Madeira (2014), Milner (1988, Osgood (2015), Schattschneider (1935). 3 For papers using models of firm heterogeneity to explore tariff setting, see Abel-Koch (2013), Chang and Willmann (2006) and Ossa (2010).…”

Section: Key Features Of the Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…These results therefore suggest an alternative gloss on Bombardini and Trebbi's (2012) findings about when industries lobby through an association, or as firms, on trade bills. In this rendering, industries are not pursuing product-specific protection but rather reacting to the heterogeneous implications of trade (Madeira, 2014).…”

Section: When Are Industries Divided Over Trade?mentioning

confidence: 99%

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Differentiated Products, Divided Industries: Firm Preferences over Trade Liberalization

Osgood

2016

Economics & Politics

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The recent focus on firms in international trade suggests two conjectures about preferences over trade policy -only the most productive firms should support freer trade, and industries can be internally divided over reciprocal liberalization. This paper clarifies the content and scope of these claims. The most productive firms are generally not the greatest beneficiaries from trade liberalization and may oppose further liberalization due to increased competition in export markets from compatriot firms. Exporting industries will feature no support for trade if foreign competition is too strong or barriers too unequal. The key analytic factor generating intraindustry division is product differentiation, both directly, by increasing export opportunities for less efficient firms, and by inducing home market effects wherein larger countries are more competitive. The implications of these findings for the distributional effects of liberalization and the study of trade politics are discussed.

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“… 34 Jensen, Quinn, and Weymouth (2015); Kim (2016); Madeira (2013); Osgood (2016); Plouffe (2012). Osgood et al (2016) is a notable exception. …”

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confidence: 99%

Firm Heterogeneity and Trade-Policy StancesEvidence from a Survey of Japanese Producers

Plouffe¹

2017

Bus. Polit.

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Recent research in international political economy has begun to explore the implications of producer heterogeneity for trade politics. Variations in productivity and size lead to systematic variations in market behaviors, especially with respect to firms' abilities to engage foreign markets. This heterogeneity similarly leads to systematic variations in policy stances: Highly productive firms are more likely to favor trade liberalization than their less productive counterparts. I test the role of firm heterogeneity on trade-policy stances using original and representative survey data of Japanese manufacturers. I find that highly productive firms are more likely to favor liberalization than others, while a large portion of producers is indifferent to trade-policy reform. Other producers do not know how they would be impacted by liberalization; these tend to be smaller than their counterparts. The relationship between productivity and pro-trade attitudes is robust, even when controlling for a wide range of internationalization modes.

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The new politics of the new trade: the political economy of intra-industry trade

Cited by 7 publications

References 112 publications

Globalizing the Supply Chain: Firm and Industrial Support for US Trade Agreements

Globalizing the Supply Chain: Firm and Industrial Support for US Trade Agreements

Differentiated Products, Divided Industries: Firm Preferences over Trade Liberalization

Firm Heterogeneity and Trade-Policy StancesEvidence from a Survey of Japanese Producers

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