The New Wave of Mobilisation in Kashmir: Religious or Political?

Abstract

The intractability of the Kashmir conundrum continues despite the success of counter-insurgency operations carried out by the Indian state which can be seen in militancy levels climbing down since the early 2000s. While in part, this is because India and Pakistan are unable to break new ground on Kashmir, a key factor is that alienation still runs deep among Kashmiri people despite duly elected governments being in place. It does not help when their anxieties are further stoked by religio-political mobilisation, such as the Amarnath land agitation in Jammu in 2008, when Hindutva forces enforced a blockade of essential supplies to the Kashmir Valley. A spate of protests have since wracked Kashmir with stone-pelters confronting security persons who use disproportionate violence to quell them. Though each street protest, whether in 2008, 2009, 2010, 2013 or 2016, had a different trigger, the underlying restlessness and alienation are constants which pose a very real danger of breeding anarchy. This article seeks to explore whether this new wave of mobilisation in Kashmir is religious or political or both in nature, its causal factors and how it is different from the armed insurgency that erupted in 1989. It contends that the state must address and fix such alienation urgently to prevent things going further downhill in the Valley.

Behind the Popular Narrative: Negotiating Life and Political Engagement in Conflicted Kashmir

“…The nature of the Kashmir movement for Azadi (Freedom in Urdu) has intensified and changed dramatically in the last couple of decades with people relying more on peaceful mass mobilizations and violent Sangbazi (stone-pelting in Urdu) as means of protest (Mohanty, 2018; Ganie, 2021). With these transformations, changes were also experienced in young people’s attitude and perception of the state and its institutions hitherto considered Haram (forbidden in Urdu).…”

Serving the Militant’s Cause: The Role of Indo-Pak State Policies in Sustaining Militancy in Kashmir

“…The third argument outlined by the literature deliberates the rise of ethno-religious sentiments among oppressed Muslim class, widespread electoral malfeasances and the arbitrary dismissal of the popular leaders being the core reasons responsible for the rise of militancy in Kashmir (see Behera, 2000, p. 164; Evans, 2000; Mohanty, 2018). This body of literature focuses upon the internal dimension of the Kashmir conflict, often focusing on India’s erosion of the democratic institutions in the Valley, circumventing the popular sentiment by unceremoniously dismissing popular leaders and constantly rigged elections to install puppet regimes, giving rise to the militancy in Kashmir.…”

“…As Ali and others have demonstrated, the Kashmiri militancy actually erupted during the 1960s, rather than the late 1980s which is cited in the common historical narrative. JKLF became the chief secessionist arm, focusing primarily on independent Kashmir, while HM and later the LeT represented irredentist wings, stressing Kashmir’s need to merge with Pakistan (Mohanty, 2018, pp. 59–71).…”

“…Both the militant groups were logistically and economically supported by Pakistan. JKLF believed in the vision of an independent Kashmir, whereas HM demanded the complete merger of Kashmir within the frontiers of Pakistan (Mohanty, 2018, pp. 59–71).…”

Perceptions of mental health services among the children who are in conflict with the law in Jammu and Kashmir

“…They can act comfortably (Johnson, 2005). In 2016 there were 65 gun-snatching incidents (Mohanty, 2018).…”