2018
DOI: 10.1007/s40802-018-0102-0
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The Non-Compliance Mechanism Under the Aarhus Convention as ‘Soft’ Enforcement of International Environmental Law: Not So Soft After All!

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Cited by 15 publications
(6 citation statements)
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References 12 publications
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“…80 Distinctive features of the compliance mechanism in Aarhus include the public trigger (i.e., the public can trigger a complaint) and the requirement of prior exhaustion of remedies (a soft admissibility requirement). 81 However, the decisions of its compliance committee are subject to consensus approval by the Convention's governing body, implicitly giving veto power to the Party whose compliance issues are at stake. 82 Escazu ˊhas significantly improved upon this provision.…”
Section: The Committee To Support Implementation and Compliancementioning
confidence: 99%
“…80 Distinctive features of the compliance mechanism in Aarhus include the public trigger (i.e., the public can trigger a complaint) and the requirement of prior exhaustion of remedies (a soft admissibility requirement). 81 However, the decisions of its compliance committee are subject to consensus approval by the Convention's governing body, implicitly giving veto power to the Party whose compliance issues are at stake. 82 Escazu ˊhas significantly improved upon this provision.…”
Section: The Committee To Support Implementation and Compliancementioning
confidence: 99%
“…Whether confrontational, formal sanctioning mechanisms or cooperative, informal NCMs facilitate the implementation of court judgments and managerial decisions beyond the nation state is a topic of growing interest in the literature, 126 including the question of whether NCMs are always 'soft'. 127 Making use of concept structures with set-theoretical categories as outlined above can be helpful to theorise and empirically compare the distinct types of enforcement along an axis ranging from soft/weak to hard/strong. Using settheoretic methods, a particularly soft non-compliance mechanism can be considered 'mostly out of the set' (of strong enforcement mechanisms), while a particularly strong sanction mechanism, such as the ability of the CJEU to impose significant daily fines, would be considered 'mostly in the set'.…”
Section: H1+2: Hpl*pap + Srm*nap  Impmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Wszystko to idzie w parze z brakiem jednego wyspecjalizowanego organu sądowego, który zapewniałby harmonijny rozwój zbioru norm odnoszących się do zmian klimatu -dotyczy to również bardziej generalnie całego międzynarodowego prawa środowiska (zjawisko tzw. fragmentation of interpretation albo fragmentation of jurisdiction) 23 . W historii międzynarodowego 18 28 -mogą stanowić pewien asumpt do uzyskania niekiedy wpadkowych, lecz ważnych w kontekście przeciwdziałania zmianom klimatu wypowiedzi orzeczniczych.…”
Section: Cechy Prawnomiędzynarodowego Reżimu Zmian Klimatuunclassified