The Non‐Occurrence of Events

McDonnell, Neil

doi:10.1111/phpr.12476

Cited by 2 publications

(1 citation statement)

References 30 publications

Supporting

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Contrasting

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“…It is arguably superior as it incorporates our judgment's contrastive sensitivity (Maslen 2004, Schaffer 2005, Northcott 2008). Introducing contrasts does raise the issue though of which of the many possible specifications of contrast should be taken as salient (McDonnell 2017). The literature generally agrees that this is determined by context but that there is no single objective procedure for exactly how, and so that these determinations must be assessed case by case.…”

Section: Some Pre-emption Casesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Pre-emption cases may support, not undermine, the counterfactual theory of causation

Northcott

2018

Synthese

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Pre-emption cases have been taken by almost everyone to imply the unviability of the simple counterfactual theory of causation. Yet there is ample motivation from scientific practice to endorse a simple version of the theory if we can. There is a way in which a simple counterfactual theory, at least if understood contrastively, can be supported even while acknowledging that intuition goes firmly against it in pre-emption casesor rather, only in some of those cases. For I present several new pre-emption cases in which causal intuition does not go against the counterfactual theory, a fact that has been verified experimentally. I suggest an account of framing effects that can square the circle. Crucially, this account offers hope of theoretical salvationbut only to the counterfactual theory of causation, not to others. Again, there is (admittedly only preliminary) experimental support for this account.

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Section: Some Pre-emption Casesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Pre-emption cases may support, not undermine, the counterfactual theory of causation

Northcott

2018

Synthese

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Halfway proportionality

Vaassen

2022

Philos Stud

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According to the so-called ‘proportionality principle’, causes should be proportional to their effects: they should be both enough and not too much for the occurrence of their effects. This principle is the subject of an ongoing debate. On the one hand, many maintain that it is required to address the problem of causal exclusion and take it to capture a crucial aspect of causation. On the other hand, many object that it renders accounts of causation implausibly restrictive and often reject the principle wholesale. I argue that there is exaggeration on both sides. While one half of the principle is overly demanding, the other half is unobjectionable. And while the unobjectionable half does not block exclusion arguments on its own, it provides a nuanced picture of higher-level causation, fits with recent developments in philosophy of causation, and motivates adjustments to standard difference-making accounts of causation. I conclude that at least half of the proportionality principle is worth taking seriously.

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The Non‐Occurrence of Events

Cited by 2 publications

References 30 publications

Pre-emption cases may support, not undermine, the counterfactual theory of causation

Pre-emption cases may support, not undermine, the counterfactual theory of causation

Halfway proportionality

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