The non-use and influence of UK Energy Sector Indicators

Abstract

This paper presents the results from a case study on the role in policymaking of UK Energy Sector Indicators (ESIs), introduced by the government in 2003. The findings show that the ESIs constituted a very minor element within the broader evidence-base used by policymakers, and that this indicator set and their objectives were poorly known even to central players in the sector. The findings of this research provide further evidence for the observation that scientific knowledge (including evaluations, assessments and indicators) seldom play an instrumental role in policymaking, and are more likely to produce indirect, conceptual and political impacts. The analysis provides a number of tentative conclusions concerning such potential indirect impacts that accrue mainly through processes of dialogue and argumentation both during the preparation of the indicators and after their publication as part of the annual reporting by the UK energy department. The ESIs have played various conceptual and political roles, yet the concrete outcomes in terms of policy change remain to be explored. The conclusions highlight the limitations of rationalist notions of direct, instrumental use in the efforts to understand the role of indicators in policymaking. The paper concludes by three tentative propositions concerning the explanations to the absence of instrumental role of the ESIs, which could be usefully explored in future research: the characteristics of the energy sector; the characteristics of the UK policy culture; and the exceptionality of the ESIs in the general evidence-base of UK energy sector.

The multiple roles of sustainability indicators in informational governance: between intended use and unanticipated influence

“…Moreover, the conceptual functions often take place before the release of indicators, through the indicator development processes [11 ,12]. And finally, empirical indicator research has questioned the assumption that 'use' automatically leads to 'influence' [13,14 ]. These findings largely echo literature on the role of evaluations, assessments, and scenarios -which has emphasised the importance of indirect forms of influence alongside the intended use of these types of information [6,7,15,16].…”

Indicators: tools for informing, monitoring or controlling?

“…Collaborative processes of indicator development may foster agreement on problem definitions, policy objectives and policy measures ). In line with findings from evaluation research, the process of indicator production -through social learning, networking, problem framing, focus and motivation -is often equally or even more influential than the 'use' of the final, published indicator (for example, Mickwitz and Melanen 2009;Lehtonen 2013; see also Chapter 2, this volume).…”

“…Indicator research and practice tends to overwhelmingly concentrate on the quality of the indicator as the 'final product', despite the growing evidence of the importance of indicator production processes as a crucial source of especially conceptual influence (for example, Mickwitz and Melanen 2009;Lehtonen 2013 …”

“…The extent of actual use and influence of these indicators still remains uncertain, not least because of the frequent doubts about their scientific credibility and technical robustness (Sébastien et al 2014). Finally, in many cases indicators are not used, simply because the potential users are not even aware of their existence -a phenomenon that also obtains for indicators within the internal-official quadrant (for example, Lehtonen 2013).…”

“…Indicator influence can concern the targeted policy or broader processes in society, such as administrative structures or the operation of democratic institutions. It can entail new or reconfirmed decisions and actions, shared understandings, and networking among, or changes in, the legitimacy of policy or policy actors (Valovirta 2002;Hezri and Dovers 2006;Pollitt 2006;Zittoun 2006;Lehtonen 2013). Indicators are not always used as intended, and the resulting influence may conflict with the objectives sought, or produce negative unintended effects (for example, Perrin 1998;Jackson 2011).…”