2008
DOI: 10.1080/09668130802434695
|View full text |Cite
|
Sign up to set email alerts
|

The Normalisation Regime and its Impact on Slovak Domestic Policy after 1970

Help me understand this report

Search citation statements

Order By: Relevance

Paper Sections

Select...
1

Citation Types

0
2
0
1

Year Published

2013
2013
2015
2015

Publication Types

Select...
3
1

Relationship

0
4

Authors

Journals

citations
Cited by 4 publications
(3 citation statements)
references
References 4 publications
0
2
0
1
Order By: Relevance
“…Prucha, 1995;Turnock, 1989). Due to the strong impacts of this factor, combined with the abovenoted lack of strong anti-Russianism and relative satisfaction of many Slovaks with the Husak regime's "success" in officially federalising the country in 1969 and in further improving leaving standards in the 1970s (Marusiak, 2008;Nedelsky, 2004), Slovakia had also experienced some earlier-discussed similar difficulties as did the Balkan states in defining the direction and pace of post-communist transition after becoming independent in 1993 (see Section 2.2, Chapter 2). Nevertheless, thanks to the fact that the other two distinctive communist legacies -the character of communist rule and the role of the church -were shared by Slovakia with their ECE neighbours and not with the Balkan states, and more importantly that it went through the first few years of post-communist transition together with the Czech part of the state, which elected a strongly pro-reformist first post-communist government, the Slovaks had much less trouble than any of their Balkan counterparts in getting rid of the non-reformist (Mečiar) government and getting back on the pro-reformist and correspondingly pro-EU post-communist track.…”
Section: The Socio-economic Effects Of Communist Industrialisation Anmentioning
confidence: 97%
“…Prucha, 1995;Turnock, 1989). Due to the strong impacts of this factor, combined with the abovenoted lack of strong anti-Russianism and relative satisfaction of many Slovaks with the Husak regime's "success" in officially federalising the country in 1969 and in further improving leaving standards in the 1970s (Marusiak, 2008;Nedelsky, 2004), Slovakia had also experienced some earlier-discussed similar difficulties as did the Balkan states in defining the direction and pace of post-communist transition after becoming independent in 1993 (see Section 2.2, Chapter 2). Nevertheless, thanks to the fact that the other two distinctive communist legacies -the character of communist rule and the role of the church -were shared by Slovakia with their ECE neighbours and not with the Balkan states, and more importantly that it went through the first few years of post-communist transition together with the Czech part of the state, which elected a strongly pro-reformist first post-communist government, the Slovaks had much less trouble than any of their Balkan counterparts in getting rid of the non-reformist (Mečiar) government and getting back on the pro-reformist and correspondingly pro-EU post-communist track.…”
Section: The Socio-economic Effects Of Communist Industrialisation Anmentioning
confidence: 97%
“…70 (1970) 9,31,110,122,188,195,197,199,200,229 Labour Code (Soviet) 35 Lagrou,206, 212 'language of grief' (Pető/Rajk) 20, 63 Latvia 2,14,16,240 Nagy, I. 9,46,47,48,62,63,64,141,165,240 National Liberal Party (Romania) 136 nationalism 7,115,121,127,133,136,138,142,145,190, 227-8 see also 'bourgeois nationalism' 'nationalist deviation ' 69,159 nationalists 41,176,184,199,205,206,243 Naydenov,A. 161 Nazi Germany/Third Reich 1,[5][6][7]204 accomplices 174,175; see also collaborators war economy 6 Nazis/Nazism [6][7]80,…”
mentioning
confidence: 98%
“…27 29 Wiatr J. Transformatsyia totalytarnykh i avtorytarnykh rezhymov v sovremennoi demokratyy, Tallynn 1991. опозицією. За такої моделі демократизації/транзиту мала місце «самовідмова» від влади частини правлячої авторитарної політичної еліти, яка стала можливою за наявності високого/достатнього рівня розвитку опозиційних рухів і партій (політичної опозиції як суспільного протесту), політичного плюралізму і розмаху руху «реформаторів» всередині правлячогорежиму 30 . На противагу, модель транзиту до демократії в Чехії і Словаччині (у межах Чехословаччини)варто характеризувати як «перелом» чи «абдикацію» 31 .…”
unclassified