The normativity of artefacts

Abstract

Part of the distinction between artefacts, objects made by humans for particular purposes, and natural objects is that artefacts are subject to normative judgements. A drill, say, can be a good drill or a poor drill, it can function well or correctly or it can malfunction. In this paper I investigate how such judgements fit into the domain of the normative in general and what the grounds for their normativity are. Taking as a starting point a general characterization of normativity proposed by Dancy, I argue how statements like 'this is a good drill' or 'this drill is malfunctioning' can be seen to express normative facts, or the content of normative statements. What they say is that a user who has a desire to achieve a particular relevant outcome has a reason to use, or not to use, the artefact in question. Next this analysis is extended to show that not just statements that say that an artefact performs its function well or poorly but all statements that ascribe a function to an artefact can be seen as expressing a normative fact. On this approach the normativity of artefacts is analyzed in terms of reasons on grounds of practical, and to a lesser extent theoretical, rationality. I close by investigating briefly to what extent reasons on moral grounds are, in the analysis adopted here, involved in the normativity of artefacts.

The functional bias of the dual nature of technical artefacts program

“…Franssen (2006) is interested in evaluative judgments, like ''this is a good drill''. Such expressions, Franssen explains, typically do not apply to the realm of nature.…”

“…When it doesn't, it is malfunctioning, or more colloquially, it is a bad specimen (Franssen, 2006;Kroes, 2006). And indeed, if one thinks that an artefact's intentional nature is exhausted by considerations of function, there seems no room for normative judgments other than those related to the object's functional performance.…”

“…They discuss how the physical and intentional natures connect (Vermaas & Houkes, 2006;Houkes & Meijers, 2006), how they come about through design (de Ridder, 2006), how the notion of proper function is couched within proper usage (Houkes, 2006), how proper function and usage are partly determined by social processes (Scheele, 2006), how the notion of proper function links to evaluative and normative judgments concerning malfunction and correct usage (Franssen, 2006). However, while the range of topics the authors cover is quite wide, I think that much remains unexplored.…”

Technological biology? Things and kinds in synthetic biology

“…First, we routinely speak of agents using an artifact 'correctly' or 'incorrectly'; second, specific tokens of an artifact type are habitually categorized as 'good' or 'bad' (Dancy 2006;Franssen 2006). Both of these commonplace judgments indicate the fundamentally normative quality underlying our interaction with technological artifacts.…”

Functions as based on a concept of general design

“…Linking function to design relies on the notion that functionality has a normative aspect. Normativity is most obvious in talk about malfunction and dysfunction (see, e.g., Neander 1995; Davies 2000Davies , 2001Krohs 2004;Franssen 2006), but also present in classifying only some of the effects of a trait as its functions, while regarding others as mere side-effects (pumping vs. throbbing noise production of the heart; see Sect. 5 below).…”