The Normativity of Rationality

Abstract

Sometimes our intentions and beliefs exhibit a structure that proves us to be irrational. Is there anything wrong with that? Should we be rational rather than irrational? This is the question that this book seeks to answer. Intuitively, the answer to this question is ‘yes’. Calling someone irrational amounts to a form of criticism. By doing so, we seem to imply that the person in question has made some kind of mistake, that her mental attitudes are in need of revision. Ordinary attributions of irrationality thus seem to presuppose that rationality is normative. This understanding is also implicit in many traditional approaches to rationality. In recent years, however, the normativity of rationality has come under attack. Many philosophers today accept the sceptical view that there may be no reason to be rational. This book defends the normativity of rationality by presenting a new solution to the problems that arise from the common assumption that we ought to be rational. The argument touches upon many other topics in the theory of normativity, such as the form and the content of rational standards or requirements, the preconditions of criticism, and the function of reasons in deliberation and advice. Over and above an extensive and careful assessment of the problems discussed in the literature, the book provides a detailed defence of a reason-response conception of rationality, a novel, evidence-relative account of reasons, and an explanation of structural irrationality in terms of these accounts.

Sceptical Deliberations

“…Broome 2013) to the more substantive requirement that one responds to reasons (see e.g. Kiesewetter 2017). We should note that even on substantive views, it must sometimes be rational for someone to reach a false conclusion, if only because she had misleading evidence.…”

Justification et rationalité des émotions

“…Brady , 2009. La question la plus épineuse est probablement celle de savoir si la rationalité doit être définie en termes de raisons (Parfit 2011 ;Scanlon 1998 ;Kiesewetter 2017) ou en termes d'autre chose, par exemple, de cohérence (Worsnip 2016) ou, comme le suggère Broome (2013), à l'aide d'une série de réquisits.…”

An alternative norm of intention consistency

“…15 15 Among them, the already mentioned McCann and Kolodny, and also theorists like Raz (2005), Kiesewetter (2017), or Lord (2018). As an anonymous referee points out, a different thesis that could also go under the “myth theory” label with respect to this issue is that so‐called “requirements” of coherence are really, when properly understood, inviolable descriptive principles that simply specify how attitudes like beliefs or intentions operate.…”