The notion of sensation in Sellars' theory of perception

Abstract

This paper reconstructs Sellars' theory of “sensation” or “sense impression,” positioning it in relation to his theoretical distinction between the Manifest and Scientific Image. Though Sellars' account of “sensation” has been a widely neglected part of his thought, it is central not only to his theory of perception but also to understanding his confrontation with traditional accounts of sensing (from Descartes to C.I. Lewis and Husserl). In this article, I first show that Sellars' argument for introducing the notion of “sensation” into his theoretical system should be understood as distinctly explanatory, rather than transcendental or phenomenological. After outlining this argument and analyzing its significance, I explore Sellars' adverbialist construal of “sensation” and its implications in relation to contemporaneous and current forms of adverbialism. Finally, in the last part of the paper, I illuminate how Sellars situates his conceptual framework for “sensations” (correctly understood) in the Manifest Image theory of perception. Highlighting Sellars' understanding of the process by which the Manifest Image substitutes sensation in the Scientific Image, I clarify Sellars' obscure notion of “sensa,” then conclude with a comprehensive account of his stereoscopic view of the phenomenon of sensing.