The NRC: What me worry?

Preferences, Knowledge, and Citizen Probability Assessments of the Terrorism Risk of Nuclear Power

“…In comparing these safety concerns to citizens' security concerns regarding nuclear power's usage, we find that respondents' probability assessments of the terrorism risk it poses do not suggest a wide demand for extensive, expensive security measures to protect nuclear power plants. This appears consistent with the controversial observation and criticism that the Nuclear Regulatory Commission has a record of imposing rather lax security standards for U.S. nuclear power plants (see Hirsch, 2002).…”

“…Moreover, both types of threats are associated with the broad notion of NR terrorism 2 . Many nuclear security experts take both types of threats seriously (e.g., Allison, 2004; Bunn & Braun, 2003; Ferguson & Potter, 2004; Hirsch, 2002). Real‐world events also suggest that nuclear power plants could be exposed to these terrorism risks 3 .…”

“…The likelihood that terrorists could acquire materials from nuclear power plants to construct crude nuclear weapons or dirty bombs for attacks is low (Bunn & Weir, 2006; Ferguson & Potter, 2004), but terrorists contemplating nuclear attacks may believe otherwise. In addition, a terrorist attack severe enough to lead to the release of nuclear materials from a nuclear power plant (e.g., a breach of a spent nuclear fuel pool) is also a low probability event, but the consequences are potentially severe (Hirsch, 2002). 6…”

The Problem of Redundancy Problem: Why More Nuclear Security Forces May Produce Less Nuclear Security†

“…The minimum requirement for five guards to be deployed at each nuclear research or power facility was based on an assumption of three terrorists “along with a single insider capable of participating in a violent attack.” There were thus four terrorists in the model threat and the NRC, therefore, set the regulation at five security guards to make sure that the guard units had a one‐man (or woman) measure of superiority. ( 22 )…”

“…There were thus four terrorists in the model threat and the NRC, therefore, set the regulation at five security guards to make sure that the guard units had a one-man (or woman) measure of superiority. (22) On the negative side, however, this NRC design basis threat ignored the possibility that the added guards themselves might be the insider threat. Leaders of the nuclear power industry and regulators insist that the insider threat problem is not a serious one since security guards and others with access to critical areas in nuclear facilities are, it is claimed, thoroughly vetted through intense background checks, random drug and alcohol tests, and security management programs, like the Continuous Behavior Observation Program, which ensures that supervisors and colleagues will report on any suspicious behavior.…”