The Nyāya Misplacement Theory of Illusion &amp; the Metaphysical Problem of Perception

Vaidya, Anand Jayprakash

doi:10.1007/978-3-319-17873-8_9

Cited by 2 publications

(3 citation statements)

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“…Vaidya (2013) argues that Dasti's evidence falls short of showing that Nyāya would embrace McDowell's variety of disjunctivism. Vaidya (2015) argues that Nyāya would embrace some kind of causal theory of disjunctivism, which this essay aims to fill out. Schiller (2019) provides the Nyāya argument for disjunctivism.…”

Section: A Pathway To Nyāya Perceptual Theorymentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In addition, consideration of Nyāya perceptual theory also allows for a distinction between perception and non-perception, where the category of non-perception is not exhausted by illusions or hallucinations. On the Nyāya causal theory of error, see Vaidya (2013Vaidya ( , 2015, illusion and hallucination are distinct from perception because of a process-wise-causal differentiation that occurs between the indeterminate (nirvikalpa, non-qualificative) first stage of perception and the determinate (savikalpa, qualificative) second stage of perception, where a subject has a person level conscious perceptual experience. In addition, there can be non-perceptions that occur because some of the conditions on perception have not been satisfied.…”

Section: A Pathway To Nyāya Perceptual Theorymentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The snake-rope case is an excellent example for illustrating the misplacement theory of illusion as a source for generating an illusion. Matilal (1992) offers an excellent account of the misplacement theory of illusion, which is further deployed and developed by Vaidya (2013Vaidya ( , 2015. Simply put, in the snake-rope case, it is because a person has (i) a fear of snakes, (ii) possesses the concept of a snake and the concept of a rope through prior reliable interaction with snakes and ropes, (iii) snakes and ropes are objectively similar with respect to their shape, and (iv) perceptual processing is susceptible to a foul up or error with respect to assembling and transferring stage-one non-qualificative perception to stage-two qualificative perception that a person can have an appearance of a snake, take it to be real, but later discover, at a closer range, that it is a rope.…”

Section: Shaw On the Nyāya On Error Through Defects And Inappropriate Causal Conditionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Multi-Factor Causal Disjunctivism: a Nyāya-Informed Account of Perceptual Disjunctivism

Vaidya¹

2020

SOPHIA

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Perceptual disjunctivism is a controversial thesis about perception. One familiar characterization of the thesis maintains that there is no common epistemic kind that is present in both veridical and non-veridical cases of perception. For example, the good case, in which one sees a yellow lemon, and the bad case, in which one hallucinates a yellow lemon, share a specific first-person phenomenology, being indistinguishable from the first-person point of view; however, seeing a yellow lemon and hallucinating a yellow lemon do not, according to the disjunctivist, share a common epistemic kind. There are two types of disjunctivism: epistemological vs. metaphysical.

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Section: A Pathway To Nyāya Perceptual Theorymentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: A Pathway To Nyāya Perceptual Theorymentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Shaw On the Nyāya On Error Through Defects And Inappropriate Causal Conditionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Multi-Factor Causal Disjunctivism: a Nyāya-Informed Account of Perceptual Disjunctivism

Vaidya¹

2020

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Elements of Knowledge-First Epistemology in Gaṅgeśa and Nyāya

Vaidya¹

2022

Oxford Studies in Epistemology Volume 7

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In this paper I argue that there are elements of Tim Williamson’s knowledge-first epistemology that can be found in the work of the fourteenth-century philosopher, Gaṅgeśa. He is the father of the new school of Nyāya. I delineate his view about perception and knowledge by comparing it to his predecessor, Gautama Akṣapāda, the father of Nyāya. On Gaṅgeśa’s knowledge is not composed of parts. And a perceptual event, understood as a veridical awareness, is a transient occurrence of perceptual knowledge. I cash out his view of perception as a special form of disjunctivism that focuses on positive and negative causal factors. I apply it to several cases to show how the theory works. I then go on to discuss Gaṅgeśa’s two-tiered theory of knowledge where there is a distinction between perceptual knowledge and certified knowledge and how it relates to the KK-principle, that when one knows they know that they know.

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The Nyāya Misplacement Theory of Illusion & the Metaphysical Problem of Perception

Cited by 2 publications

References 14 publications

Multi-Factor Causal Disjunctivism: a Nyāya-Informed Account of Perceptual Disjunctivism

Multi-Factor Causal Disjunctivism: a Nyāya-Informed Account of Perceptual Disjunctivism

Elements of Knowledge-First Epistemology in Gaṅgeśa and Nyāya

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