The obedient mind and the volitional brain: A neural basis for preserved sense of agency and sense of responsibility under coercion

Abstract

Milgram’s classical studies famously suggested a widespread willingness to obey authority, even to the point of inflicting harm. Important situational factors supporting obedience, such as proximity with the victim, have been established. Relatively little work has focused on how coercion affects individual cognition, or on identifying the cognitive factors that underlie inter-individual differences in the tendency to yield to coercion. Here, we used fMRI to investigate the neural systems associated with changes in volitional processes associated with sense of agency and sense of responsibility under coercion. Participants either freely chose, or were instructed by the experimenter, to give mildly painful electric shocks to another participant, or to refrain from doing so. We have previously shown that coercion reduces temporal binding, which has been proposed as an implicit proxy measure of sense of agency. We tested how reduced agency under coercion related to differences in neural activity between free choice and coercion. In contrast to previous studies and to participants performing the task outside the MRI scanner, on average there was no effect of coercion on agency for participants in the scanner. However, greater activity in the medial frontal gyrus was reliably associated with greater agency under coercion. A similar association was found using explicit responsibility ratings. Our findings suggest that medial frontal processes, perhaps related to volition during action planning and execution, may help to preserve a sense of accountability under coercion. Further, participants who administered more shocks under free choice showed reduced activity during free choice trials in brain areas associated with social cognition. Possibly, this might reflect participants cognitively distancing themselves from the recipient of the shocks under free choice, whereas this was not observed under coercion.

Commanding or Being a Simple Intermediary: How Does It Affect Moral Behavior and Related Brain Mechanisms?

“…In Study 2, in addition to the feeling of responsibility for the outcomes of one’s own action, we also integrated an implicit measure of the sense of agency over one’s own action based on interval estimates. A previous study showed that the sense of agency and the feeling of responsibility can be influenced similarly by obedience to authority and freedom of choice ( Caspar et al, 2021 ), and another study showed that following a training session emphasizing responsibility can enhance the sense of agency ( Caspar et al, 2020a ). However, they refer to two different phenomenological experiences and may thus also have different relations to behaviors ( Balconi, 2010 ).…”

The anti-anxiety drug lorazepam changes implicit behaviors but not explicit evaluations of sense of agency under authoritative pressure: A functional magnetic resonance imaging study

“…Hence individuals under coercive control frequently suffer from anxiety. On one hand, previous neuroscientific research addressing coercion has shown that anxiety and/or fear congeals cognitive resources and hampers cognitive functions, in such a way that the participants who obeyed orders did not subjectively experience their actions as voluntary ones, but rather as passive movements devoid of any sense of agency ( Caspar et al, 2016 , 2018 , 2020a , 2020b , 2021 ). At a neural level, this was observed as a reduction in the auditory N1 ERP component amplitude when the subject was under coercion, relative to the condition where he could choose freely to perform an action; thus, the brain engaging in a decrement of sensory processing in anticipation of the action outcomes, and which, again, translates into perceiving the repercussions of actions executed under coercive pressure as if they had been triggered passively ( Caspar et al, 2016 , 2021 ).…”

“…On one hand, previous neuroscientific research addressing coercion has shown that anxiety and/or fear congeals cognitive resources and hampers cognitive functions, in such a way that the participants who obeyed orders did not subjectively experience their actions as voluntary ones, but rather as passive movements devoid of any sense of agency ( Caspar et al, 2016 , 2018 , 2020a , 2020b , 2021 ). At a neural level, this was observed as a reduction in the auditory N1 ERP component amplitude when the subject was under coercion, relative to the condition where he could choose freely to perform an action; thus, the brain engaging in a decrement of sensory processing in anticipation of the action outcomes, and which, again, translates into perceiving the repercussions of actions executed under coercive pressure as if they had been triggered passively ( Caspar et al, 2016 , 2021 ). On the other hand, studies exploring the neural origin of the N1 component, did so by isolating glutamatergic receptor function through micro-injections of the somatosensory barrel cortex (S1BF) in anesthetized rats with sub-convulsive concentrations of the competitive gamma-aminobutyric acid (GABA A ) receptor antagonist bicuculline methiodide (BMI) ( Krishek et al, 1996 ; Ueno et al, 1997 ; Jones and Barth, 2002 ; Johnston, 2013 ); and with the results showing that the greater the suppression of inhibition by the BMI, the broader and larger the N1 pulse width and amplitude became, respectively ( Bruyns-Haylett et al, 2017 ).…”

Shared responsibility decreases the sense of agency in the human brain

“…The brain mechanisms that underly our sense of responsibility for the outcomes of our actions have generally been investigated by comparing active vs forced (or passive) choices [6][7][8][9][10].…”

“…The brain mechanisms that underly our sense of responsibility for the outcomes of our actions have generally been investigated by comparing active vs forced (or passive) choices [6–10]. The subjective experience of a coerced (or instructed) action is similar to that of a passive action and is associated with reduced neural processing of an action’s outcome [6].…”