The one constant: a causal effect of collective bargaining on employment growth? Evidence from German linked‐employer‐employee data

Abstract

Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Using various approaches, however, we cannot establish a causal interpretation of the effects, suggesting that the cross-section results are driven by selection. Terms of use: Documents in

Productivity and Wage Effects of Firm‐Level Collective Agreements: Evidence from Belgian Linked Panel Data

“…2018; Gürtzgen 2009). In particular, little is known on whether workers benefit more from firm rents (through higher wages) in the presence of a firm‐level collective agreement and how this interacts with product market competition (Brändle and Goerke 2018; Gürtzgen 2010; Rusinek and Rycx 2013).…”

“…Evidence for European countries is much less clear‐cut. The study of Brändle and Goerke (2018), for instance, investigates the relationship between collective bargaining and employment growth in German plants. Using linked employer–employee data, their results based on cross‐sectional variation show that annual employment growth in plants covered by an industry‐ or a firm‐level collective agreement is about 1 per cent point lower than in uncovered plants.…”

“…However, this correlation becomes statistically insignificant when the authors rely on panel estimation methods. Accordingly, the authors conclude that ‘within‐variation fails to identify a significant (short‐term) causal effect from changing bargaining status’ (Brändle and Goerke 2018: 469). Another interesting study is that of Jimeno and Thomas (2013).…”

Losing Control? Unions’ Representativeness, Pirate Collective Agreements, and Wages

“…A number of empirical studies have focused on the rigidity of sector-level wage bargaining (Avouyi-Dovi et al 2013), on the distribution of wages (Cardoso and Portugal 2005) and on rent sharing (Card et al 2013;Devicienti et al 2018). Other studies looked into the role played by collective bargaining systems in shaping employment and unemployment dynamics (Brändle and Goerke 2018;Bryson and Dale-Olsen 2008;DiNardo Losing Control? / 191 and Lee 2004;Magruder 2012;Martins 2014) as well as employer-specific wage differentials (Gürtzgen 2009;Martins 2009;Rusinek and Rycx 2013).…”

“…A number of empirical studies have focused on the rigidity of sector‐level wage bargaining (Avouyi‐Dovi et al 2013), on the distribution of wages (Cardoso and Portugal 2005) and on rent sharing (Card et al 2013; Devicienti et al 2018). Other studies looked into the role played by collective bargaining systems in shaping employment and unemployment dynamics (Brändle and Goerke 2018; Bryson and Dale‐Olsen 2008; DiNardo and Lee 2004; Magruder 2012; Martins 2014) as well as employer‐specific wage differentials (Gürtzgen 2009; Martins 2009; Rusinek and Rycx 2013). In general, most empirical studies find that under sector‐level collective agreements, wages are less resilient to economic shocks and more likely to translate into employment adjustments or working hours reductions (Guriev et al 2019; Izquierdo et al 2017; Ronchi and Di Mauro 2017).…”