The Ontology of Organismic Agency: A Kantian Approach

Abstract

Biologists explain organisms' behavior not onlya sh avingb een programmed by genes and shaped by natural selection, but also as the resulto f an organism'sa gency:t he capacity to react to environmental changes in goaldrivenw ays. The use of such 'agential explanations' reopens old questions about how justified it is to ascribea gencyt oe ntities like bacteria or plants that obviouslylack rationality and even anervous system. Is organismic agency genuinely 'real' or is it justauseful fiction?Inthis paper we focus on two questions: whether agential explanations are to be interpreted ontically, and whether they can be reduced to non-agential explanations (thereby dispensing with agency). The Kantian approach we identify interprets agential explanations non-ontically, yetholds agency to be indispensable. Attributing agency to organisms is not to be takenl iterallyint he wayw eattribute physical properties such as mass or acceleration, but nor is it amere heuristic or predictive tool. Rather,it is an inevitable consequence of our ownrational capacity:aslong as we are rational agents ourselves, we cannot avoid seeing agency in organisms.

Agential autonomy and biological individuality

“…There are various accounts of biological agency (e.g., Arnellos & Moreno, 2015; Barandiaran et al, 2009; Burge, 2009; Corning et al, 2023; Desmond & Huneman, 2020; Gunawardena, 2022; Kauffman, 2000; Lewens, 2007; McShea, 2012; Moreno & Mossio, 2015; Okasha, 2018; Skewes & Hooker, 2009; Thompson, 2007; Turner, 2017). One of the most developed and the most useful for my purposes is the ecological or dynamical account according to which, agency is the gross dynamical property of a goal‐directed system to bias its repertoire in response to what its conditions afford (Fulda, 2016, 2017, 2020; Sultan et al, 2022; Walsh, 2012, 2015, 2018).…”

The Generalized Selective Environment

“…An agential explanation thus appeal to the intentions and/or reasons humans have for adhering to or rejecting honor norms. What agential explanations mean in non-human biological context is a different and ongoing question (see also Desmond and Huneman 2020), but for purposes of this paper can simply be construed as explaining organismic behavior as if the organism were acting like an intentional agent.…”

Teleology and mechanism: a dialectical approach

“…The function debate, on the other hand, has been a constant in philosophy of science for more than fifty years, showing off a longevity with few peers but also an immobility that has justifiably generated the impression of a 'fruitless' and 'boring' exercise (Cooper, 2018;Lewens, 2004). Yet with the dominance of the neo-Darwinian synthesis being called into question (Laland et al, 2015;Pigliucci & Müller, 2010) and discussions of organismal agency beginning to make their mark in theoretical biology (Aaby & Desmond, 2021;Desmond & Huneman, 2020;Jaeger, 2023;Walsh, 2015), teleology might be making a comeback.…”