The ontology of Schelling’s “Theory of Interdependent Decisions”

Abstract

The present paper offers a methodological contribution on Schelling's insight into game theory drawing both on his proposition for a "reorientation of game theory" and his dynamic models of residential segregation. It aims to show how these respective works exhibit coherence in Schelling's thinking. It is often claimed that Schelling criticizes standard game theory without proposing any conceptual solution. To the contrary, I assert that the methodological constraints Schelling identifies in standard game theory support the proposition of a new type of modeling in the dynamic models of residential segregation: the first agent based modeling. I argue that the agent-based models provide a theoretic ground to formalize the methodological innovations proposed in his "reorientation of game theory." To understand such a claim I stress the social ontology underlined in Schelling's conception of a "theory of interdependent decisions."

Meeting and Missing Minds: Children and Adults Use Alignment of Intuitions to Solve Pure Coordination Games

“…Pure coordination games (such as the New York problem above) are classically studied in behavioural economics. In canonical versions there is no conflict of interest between players (neither has a preference about where to meet), and there is symmetry between the possible payoffs (it is equally good to meet anywhere -for important variations and extensions see e.g., Colman, 1997Colman, , 2006Isoni et al, 2013;Larrouy, 2018). Considering their prominent place in theories of coordination, communication, negotiation, and bargaining (Bacharach, 2006;Camerer, 2003;Pickering & Garrod, 2021;Vesper et al, 2017;Zawidzki, 2013;, the psychological basis of success on pure coordination problems has received surprisingly limited attention.…”