The opportunities and challenges of crisis cartel during demand disruptions: A game theoretic study

Abstract

Crisis cartel refers to the collaboration between organisations during unprecedented conditions to counter the effect of disruption during an economic crisis. Despite its prevalence, scholarly attention to this phenomenon remains scant. Employing a dual‐channel framework involving manufacturers, online retailers (ORs) and traditional brick‐and‐mortar retailers (BMRs), the authors scrutinised the efficacy of crisis cartels in mitigating the impact of negative demand disruptions. Three distinct game theoretic frameworks were applied to model the interactive dynamics between the supply chain partners, namely, the horizontal Nash game, the Stackelberg game and the collusion game. It was observed that, during disruption under crisis cartels, the optimal price and profit of both the downstream channel partners increased, whereas the optimal order quantity decreased. Manufacturers and consumers are worse off in terms of profit and consumer surplus, respectively, during the crisis cartel engagement between BMR and OR. Nonetheless, a crisis cartel emerged as a potential solution to address negative demand disruptions. In evaluating post‐disruption cartels, the study finds the necessity of regulating crisis cartels. The findings offer valuable insights for policymakers, market regulators and practitioners, suggesting the need for strategic regulatory adjustments to effectively manage disruptions through the prudent utilisation of crisis cartel as a proactive management tool. The study expands existing theory by providing novel insights into the strategic interactions and dynamics within collaborative responses to demand disruptions, thus offering a pioneering approach to crisis management research.