The optimal combination between blockchain and sales format in an internet platform-based closed-loop supply chain

Ma, Deqing; Hu, Jinsong

doi:10.1016/j.ijpe.2022.108633

Cited by 32 publications

(7 citation statements)

References 51 publications

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“…(1) According to the research by Ma et al [8] and Ma and Hu [9], differential game theory is a particularly good approach when solving problems of dynamic optimization in continuous PLOS ONE time. Compared with existing technologies, this paper focuses on a new exploration framework for studying the problem of dynamically combating counterfeit products with blockchain technology.…”

Section: Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…(3) In fact, consumer demand is affected not only by product price but also by product quality, service experience, brand image and other factors. Therefore, based on the demand model in the relevant literature [8,9], it is assumed that the consumer demand for the genuine product sales channel and counterfeit product sales channel are as follows:…”

Section: Plos Onementioning

confidence: 99%

“…On this basis, Krishnamoorthy et al [ 52 ] analyzed the dynamic advertising and pricing decisions of durable products in a duopoly. Ma et al [ 8 ] and Ma and Hu [ 9 ] incorporated the quality reference utility of consumers into the state equation of brand goodwill and studied the dynamic operation strategies of O2O supply chains and closed-loop supply chains; subsequently, Ma et al [ 53 ] further investigated the optimal combination of blockchain in terms of recycling old products and sales forms in a closed-loop supply chain composed of a manufacturer and an online platform, selecting online platforms to achieve triple sustainability in the economy, environment, and society. In addition, Guan et al [ 54 ] studied channel coordination under Nash bargaining fairness concerns from the perspective of a differential game of goodwill accumulation.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In addition, for brand owners in genuine sales channels, the brand goodwill for products is related to the good image of enterprises and consumers’ favorable impression of enterprises, which originates from an enterprise’s good reputation, reliable product quality, high-quality store service level and a favorable business position. Existing evidence shows that [ 7 ] brand goodwill is not static with changes in the market environment but is more dynamic and continuous [ 8 , 9 ]. Although the literature has considered using blockchain technology in the supply chain to combat counterfeit products (e.g., Shen et al, [ 1 ]; Pun et al, [ 4 ]; Danese et al, [ 10 ]; Haq and Muselemu, [ 11 ]), there are still some research gaps.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Dynamic supervision of counterfeit products based on blockchain technology: A differential game on goodwill accumulation

Sun,

Xu,

Liu

2023

PLoS ONE

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Counterfeiting is a serious problem in many industries, and the annual profit and tax losses caused by counterfeit products in China have reached over 60 billion yuan. The focus of this paper is to study the effect of blockchain technology in terms of supervising counterfeit products as well as product quality and service decisions under blockchain from a dynamic optimization perspective. We consider the role of blockchain when disclosing product quality information and develop a dynamic optimization model before and after blockchain adoption using differential game theory. Meanwhile, we solve the model using the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equation and backward induction and conduct parametric, comparative, and numerical analyses of the equilibrium solutions. The main findings are as follows: First, we find that in the absence of blockchain, counterfeit products can reduce brand goodwill and decrease the quality and service level of genuine products; however, supervising counterfeit product sales through blockchain can improve this problem under the critical conditions determined in this work. Second, in the direct sales mode, we find that if the unit operating cost and fixed cost of blockchain are small, the brand owner’s adoption of blockchain can not only combat the counterfeiter’s profit but also increase its own profit. Third, in the wholesale sales mode, we find that the best conditions in which a brand owner can establish blockchain are only related to the related costs of blockchain, while retailers also need to increase the selling price of genuine products when establishing blockchain. Fourth, we find that supply chain performance and blockchain supervisory effects are sensitive to key parameters through numerical analysis in a quantitative form. These findings have important implications for genuine enterprises in terms of determining the conditions for establishing blockchain to combat counterfeiting and for optimizing product quality and service decisions when using blockchain technology.

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Section: Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Plos Onementioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Dynamic supervision of counterfeit products based on blockchain technology: A differential game on goodwill accumulation

Sun,

Xu,

Liu

2023

PLoS ONE

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“…Blockchain technology is closely related to e-commerce. Ma and Hu talked about how platforms could maximize the synergy between "blockchain + sales formats" to enhance CLSC’s ESS (economic, social, and environmental) performance [ 34 ]. Liu et al discussed the recycling channel structure selection problem of the e-commerce CLSC.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Remanufacturing and channel strategies in e-commerce closed-loop supply chain

Shi,

Ma,

Yang

2024

PLoS ONE

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This paper studies the recycling and remanufacturing mode and sales channel issues in the closed-loop supply chain. Specifically, this study establishes an e-commerce closed-loop supply chain consisting of a manufacturer and an e-commerce platform, and divides the recycling model into recycling by the manufacturer or recycling by the platform. Considering two common sales models in e-commerce platforms: the resale model and agency model, combined with the recycling model, four different research scenarios are formed. We use backward induction to solve the Stackelberg game problem and explore the remanufacturing and channel strategies of the manufacturer and the e-commerce platform. The research results show that for the manufacturer, under the same recycling model, when consumers’ preference for remanufactured products and the sensitivity of recycling volume to recycling prices are low, he will prefer the resale model. Under the same sales model, the manufacturer always prefers the recycling model in which he is responsible for recycling. However, the choice of platform is contrary to that of the manufacturer. In the resale model, both the manufacturer and the platform will choose to recycle by themselves, which cannot achieve a win-win situation. Under the agency model, when consumers’ preference for remanufactured products is high and the sensitivity coefficient of recycling volume to recycling price is low, supply chain members can achieve a win-win situation, and the scope of the win-win situation decreases as the unit production cost of new products increases. In addition, rising consumer preference for remanufactured products will lead to lower consumer surplus.

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Manufacturer’s optimal distribution strategy in the platform supply chain: Bundling or add-on?

Wang,

Shi

et al. 2024

Ann Oper Res

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This study delves into the realm of distribution strategies employed in retail markets, particularly focusing on the widely utilized bundle-and-add-on strategy. Three distinct distribution strategies are examined: bundled-by-the-base-manufacturer (BBBM), bundled-by-the-platform, and the add-on approach within a platform supply chain context. Through comprehensive analysis, this paper investigates the optimal distribution strategy for manufacturers. Significantly, our research reveals that in cases where only bundling is feasible, base manufacturers can reap benefits from a self-bundling strategy when both the platform’s commission rate and the marginal cost of the bundled product are low. Additionally, the platform stands to gain from this approach when the commission rate is low, and the marginal cost of the bundled product is either moderate or very high. Notably, win–win scenarios can emerge for both manufacturers and platforms through specific bundling or platform bundling strategies under specific conditions. Furthermore, the study demonstrates that the price of bundles under the add-on strategy will be lower, attracting more consumers, especially when the commission rate is low. Intriguingly, when the marginal cost of the base product is low, the add-on strategy consistently emerges as the optimal choice; as costs escalate, BBBM might be optimal, especially when the commission rate is low, showcasing a nuanced understanding of the interplay between costs and strategic choices in distribution. The major contribution of this paper lies in its nuanced analysis of these strategies and their implications for both manufacturers and platforms in the retail landscape.

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The optimal combination between blockchain and sales format in an internet platform-based closed-loop supply chain

Cited by 32 publications

References 51 publications

Dynamic supervision of counterfeit products based on blockchain technology: A differential game on goodwill accumulation

Dynamic supervision of counterfeit products based on blockchain technology: A differential game on goodwill accumulation

Remanufacturing and channel strategies in e-commerce closed-loop supply chain

Manufacturer’s optimal distribution strategy in the platform supply chain: Bundling or add-on?

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