The optimal level of copyright protection

Yoon, Kiho

doi:10.1016/s0167-6245(01)00062-2

Cited by 102 publications

(75 citation statements)

References 12 publications

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“…The solution to this problem yields the full information level of y H , specified by (9). This is exactly the same solution as in Case I.…”

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confidence: 80%

Piracy prevention and the pricing of information goods

Cremer

2009

Information Economics and Policy

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This paper develops a simple model of piracy to analyze its effects on prices and welfare and to study the optimal enforcement policy. A monopolist produces an information good (involving a "large" development cost and a "small" reproduction cost) that is sold to two groups of consumers differing in their valuation of the good. We distinguish two settings: one in which the monopoly is regulated and one in which it maximizes profits and is not regulated, except that the public authority may be responsible for the control of piracy. We show that copying or piracy might be welfare enhancing because it is a way to "provide" the good to some individuals (those with a low willingness to pay) without undermining the firm's ability to finance the development cost via the pricing scheme applied to high valuation consumers. The level of piracy control differs according to the regulatory environment. Three levels of piracy control emerge. The highest is the one chosen by the private monopoly. The next level is the one chosen by the regulated monopoly. The lowest, that can be zero, is the level of control chosen by the public authority when the good is sold (and priced) by a private monopoly.JEL classification: L11, L86, D82

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“…The solution to this problem yields the full information level of y H , specified by (9). This is exactly the same solution as in Case I.…”

mentioning

confidence: 80%

Piracy prevention and the pricing of information goods

Cremer

2009

Information Economics and Policy

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“…As users are typically hurt from better software protection-either due to the fact that software is harder to copy or due to higher software prices resulting from a reduced threat of piracy-, the case where θ < 0 seems to be the most relevant. For the largest part of the paper, we will present our results using this general formulation but we will consider some specific applications (see Section 4) drawing on the piracy models of Yoon (2002), Belleflamme (2003), as well as Bae and Choi (2006). These models provide a microfoundation for our more general formulation.…”

Section: Effects Of Software Protection and Piracymentioning

confidence: 99%

“…We make use of a framework where legal and illegal types of software are vertically differentiated (Yoon, 2002;Belleflamme, 2003;Bae and Choi, 2006).…”

Section: Examplementioning

confidence: 99%

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Piracy in a two-sided software market

Rasch

Wenzel

2013

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Terms of use: Documents in AbstractThis paper studies the impact of software piracy in a two-sidedmarket setting. Software platforms attract developers and users to maximize their profits. The equilibrium price structure is affected by piracy: license fees to developers are higher with more software protection but the impact on user prices is ambiguous. A conflict between platforms and software developers over software protection may arise: whereas one side benefits from better protection, the other party loses out. Under platform compatibility, this conflict is no longer present.

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“…The welfare effects of intellectual property protection have been studied in other contexts, often focusing on the optimal theoretical level of copyright protection for the purpose of inducing investment in creative works (Novos and Waldman (1984) and Yoon (2002)), or the theoretical effects of piracy or unauthorized copying on firm profits and social welfare (Ordover and Willig (1978), Johnson (1985), Liebowitz (1985), and Takayama (1994 and). Perhaps the most closely related previous paper is Liebowitz (1986), which studies the impact of price discrimination by journal publishers on the working of copyright law.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%