2019
DOI: 10.1080/03085147.2019.1627791
|View full text |Cite
|
Sign up to set email alerts
|

The organization of markets for collective concerns and their failures

Abstract: This version of the article has been accepted for publication and undergone full peer review but has not been through the copyediting, typesetting, pagination and proofreading process, which may lead to differences between this version and the publisher's final version AKA Version of Record.

Help me understand this report

Search citation statements

Order By: Relevance

Paper Sections

Select...
2
1
1
1

Citation Types

0
37
0

Year Published

2020
2020
2024
2024

Publication Types

Select...
9

Relationship

0
9

Authors

Journals

citations
Cited by 60 publications
(37 citation statements)
references
References 47 publications
0
37
0
Order By: Relevance
“…Whilst we support Frankel, Ossandón and Pallesen's (2019) call to study markets for collective concerns, we do not regard market features as a policy instrument in their own right. We suggest that policy instruments carry selected and adapted elements of markets to novel domains to ‘… programme the doing of a particular reality’ (Voß, 2016, p. 7), as illustrated by Dix (2014, 2016), Krafve (2014) and Neyland, Ehrenstein and Milyaeva (2019).…”
Section: Performing the Marketization Of The Nhsmentioning
confidence: 69%
See 1 more Smart Citation
“…Whilst we support Frankel, Ossandón and Pallesen's (2019) call to study markets for collective concerns, we do not regard market features as a policy instrument in their own right. We suggest that policy instruments carry selected and adapted elements of markets to novel domains to ‘… programme the doing of a particular reality’ (Voß, 2016, p. 7), as illustrated by Dix (2014, 2016), Krafve (2014) and Neyland, Ehrenstein and Milyaeva (2019).…”
Section: Performing the Marketization Of The Nhsmentioning
confidence: 69%
“…A preexisting reality does not speak for itself, inevitably short-circuiting policy initiatives in advance. ' Frankel, Ossandón and Pallesen (2019) suggest that selective features of markets -such as competition or prices -have become policy instruments in their own right as marketization reforms spread. One example of selective marketization is provided by the quasi-market interventions carried out by successive UK governments (Le Grand, 1991Grand, , 2006.…”
Section: Performing the Marketization Of The Nhsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…As market designers and ‘choice architects’, they have helped to transform parts of economics into a ‘practice field’, one that engages in the active engineering of markets. From this perspective, the problem is information, a question of how markets can be designed in such a way that they are capable of processing ever-larger quantities of data, as well as ‘nudging’ deficient human subjects in accordance with their real preferences, and socially optimal outcomes, under conditions of incomplete knowledge (Frankel et al., 2019; Lash and Dragos, 2016; Nik-Khah and Mirowski, 2019).…”
Section: Market Scriptsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…This has had three consequences: (I) voters do no longer feel represented by their consensus seeking political representatives; (II) a neoliberal policy agenda emerged characterized by the introduction of market mechanisms; (III) such neoliberal policy agendas have led to new uncertainties, stemming from a retrenchment of welfare policies and (misplaced) devotion to the regulatory qualities of markets. 10 These developments pushed apprehensive citizens to find new forms of political representation.…”
Section: Some Concerns About the Direction Of This Research Agendamentioning
confidence: 99%