The Ottoman Conquest of Egypt (1517) and the Beginning of the Sixteenth-Century World War

Abstract

Throughout the fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries major changes in the relations between great states once again highlighted the importance of a land whose history marks all ages — Egypt. Students of Western naval explorations are familiar with the significant place of Egypt in the imperial plans of the Portuguese during their expansion into the Indian Ocean after 1488. But while the Portuguese attempt to control the Red Sea and Persian Gulf trading routes brought Egyptian history solidly within the periphery of European scholarly interest, the almost simultaneous conquest of the Mamluk empire by the Ottomans (1517) makes no such impact on the historiography of the Western world. Yet the seizure of Syria, Egypt, and Arabia not only catapulted the Ottomans into a position of leadership within the vast Muslim community, but it also gave the Istanbul regime resources sufficient to project its power north to the gates of Vienna and west to the Strait of Gibraltar. Could this ‘distant’ conquest have played a more active role in the history of Europe than hitherto imagined? Clearly the answer to this question involves a comparison between the imperial histories of Europe and the Middle East during the age of the Renaissance. Once the first steps are taken to break the artificial historical divisions preventing such a comparison, there is little doubt that Selim the Grim's victory over the Mamluk empire was a major event in both European and Middle Eastern history.

Deafening silence? Marxism, international historical sociology and the spectre of Eurocentrism

“…Yet beyond such descriptive categorisations, the Ottoman interaction with the European states during the early modern period marked a causal configuration in which both the individual states and the states-system in general were correspondingly affected. Explicit manifestations of such reciprocity can be observed in the period of Franco-Ottoman Alliance (16–19th centuries) or in the Ottoman–Habsburg struggle which directly influenced the Atlantic expansion of the European maritime powers through the Ottoman control of Egypt and Syria (Hess, 1973; Jensen, 1985).…”

The Ottoman origins of capitalism: uneven and combined development and Eurocentrism

“…65 The Ottomans were able to raise vast and loyal armies for military campaigns, while maintaining comparatively uninterrupted lines of communication and supplies. 66 Ottoman intra-ruling class unity also contrasted significantly with the fragmentation associated with the parcellised sovereignty of feudal Europe, 67 a developmental advantage often exploited by the Ottoman Empire in military campaigns 68 making them geopolitical accumulators -empire buildersextraordinaires. This relation of unevenness was neatly captured by Aeneas Sylvius (future Pope Pius II) who, after the fall of Constantinople in 1453, reflected on the existential threat the Ottomans posed to a disunited Christendom:…”

Information in Southeast Europe: A Historical Perspective

“…However, they fell short of achieving cultural integration; it used to be said that the Ottoman Empire was composed of 72 1/2 millets (nations, not to be taken in the present western meaning; the 1/2 was for the gypsies). Moriscos from Spain (Hess 1973 the expanding Russian Empire) and even some Arabs (after North Africa fell under .rench control) were given the choice between converting to Christianity or fleeing to the Ottoman Empire. Merchant guilds in the cities played a pan-Ottoman role, but professional specialization intervened on a millet basis like Ragusan engineers in the mining sector, Greek salesmen and ship owners, Armenian bakers, and Jewish bankers, jewellers, textile manufacturers and tailors (Mardin 1962).…”