The outbreak of cooperation among success-driven individuals under noisy conditions

Abstract

According to Thomas Hobbes' Leviathan [1651; 2008 (Touchstone, New York), English Ed], ''the life of man [is] solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short,'' and it would need powerful social institutions to establish social order. In reality, however, social cooperation can also arise spontaneously, based on local interactions rather than centralized control. The self-organization of cooperative behavior is particularly puzzling for social dilemmas related to sharing natural resources or creating common goods. Such situations are often described by the prisoner's dilemma. Here, we report the sudden outbreak of predominant cooperation in a noisy world dominated by selfishness and defection, when individuals imitate superior strategies and show success-driven migration. In our model, individuals are unrelated, and do not inherit behavioral traits. They defect or cooperate selfishly when the opportunity arises, and they do not know how often they will interact or have interacted with someone else. Moreover, our individuals have no reputation mechanism to form friendship networks, nor do they have the option of voluntary interaction or costly punishment. Therefore, the outbreak of prevailing cooperation, when directed motion is integrated in a game-theoretical model, is remarkable, particularly when random strategy mutations and random relocations challenge the formation and survival of cooperative clusters. Our results suggest that mobility is significant for the evolution of social order, and essential for its stabilization and maintenance.evolution ͉ pattern formation ͉ spatial games ͉ mobility ͉ migration

Adaptive Dynamics with Interaction Structure

“…This excludes an important class of models in which behaviors affecting the interaction structure or update rule coevolve with strategy (Le Galliard et al, 2005;Pacheco et al, 2006a,b;Fu et al, 2008;Helbing and Yu, 2009;Perc and Szolnoki, 2010;Wu et al, 2010). For such models, the value of the structure coefficient may vary with the considered game and resident strategy.…”

“…Other models use interaction structures that incorporate some notion of locality. For example, individuals may interact only if they are members of the same group (Taylor, 1992;Traulsen and Nowak, 2006;Ohtsuki, 2010), neighbors on a lattice (Nowak and May, 1992;Wilson et al, 1992;Durrett and Levin, 1994;Killingback and Doebeli, 1996;Nakamaru et al, 1997;Hauert and Doebeli, 2004;Helbing and Yu, 2009;Roca et al, 2009), or are connected through the (current) social network (van Baalen and Rand, 1998;Santos and Pacheco, 2005;Ohtsuki et al, 2006;Pacheco et al, 2006a,b;Taylor et al, 2007a;Perc and Szolnoki, 2010;. In the most abstract sense, a model's interaction structure can be understood as a mapping from its current state to the current collection of game-interaction partners.…”

“…Well-studied examples include evolution in spatially structured populations (Wright, 1943;Kimura and Weiss, 1964;Barton and Slatkin, 1986;Durrett and Levin, 1994;Tilman and Kareiva, 1997;Dieckmann et al, 2000;Rousset, 2004;Lieberman et al, 2005;Lion and van Baalen, 2008) in group-or demestructured populations (Wright, 1931;Wilson, 1977;Taylor, 1992;Hanski and Gilpin, 1997;Traulsen and Nowak, 2006;Ohtsuki, 2010), and in populations with active assortment by kin (Hamilton, 1971;Eshel and Cavalli-Sforza, 1982) or phenotype (Antal et al, 2009). These forms of localized interaction have significant consequences for the evolution of cooperation (Nowak and May, 1992;Killingback and Doebeli, 1996;Nakamaru et al, 1997;Mitteldorf and Wilson, 2000;Santos and Pacheco, 2005;Ohtsuki et al, 2006;Traulsen and Nowak, 2006;Taylor et al, 2007a;Fletcher and Doebeli, 2009;Helbing and Yu, 2009;van Veelen et al, 2012), host-parasite interactions (Hassell et al, 1991;Herre, 1993;Boots and Sasaki, 1999;Haraguchi and Sasaki, 2000;van Baalen, 2002;Read and Keeling, 2003;Boots et al, 2004), signaling …”

Bet hedging based cooperation can limit kin selection and form a basis for mutualism

“…Such a strategy is known as bet hedging (Philippi and Seger, 1989;Ellner, 2009). Its role in cooperation has remained unexplored, although there is interest in variation as cooperation-enhancing mechanism (Wagner, 2003;McNamara et al, 2004;Helbing, 2008;Santos et al, 2008). In the human setting many variations occur that can be alleviated through cooperation.…”

Big Data, Privacy, and Trusted Web: What Needs to Be Done

“…Given the availability of a lot of personal information to everyone, however, the Internet does not allow this anymore. In this connection, it is important to note that undermining the mechanism of voluntary segregation can seriously affect the cooperation among people, to the disadvantage of everybody [23,24].…”