‘The Palestinian Dream’ in the Kurdish context

Abstract

Turkey’s rising leftist student movement in the late 1960s admired the Palestinian Fedayeen movement and considered it as a school for their own future struggle. In the late 1960s young Turkish-Kurdish leftist students went to Palestinian guerilla camps in Lebanon to be trained in preparation for armed struggle in Turkey. That relationship gained new momentum following the 1980 military coup in Turkey, which heavily impacted Turkish and Kurdish radical movements. The Palestinian camps turned out to be a major retreat for these Turkish-Kurdish groups, among whom the PKK was a primary beneficiary. The PKK seized this opportunity not only for military training but also for organisational recovery which almost no other Turkish or Kurdish movement managed. This article aims to trace the relationship between Turkish-Kurdish radical movements and Palestinian organisations, focusing mainly on the PKK. I argue that the PKK has made use of this relationship in realising the so-called “Palestinian Dream” within the Kurdish context. “Xewna Felestînê” li meydana kurdîKurte Hereketa xwendekarên çepgir ya Tirkiyeyê, ku di dawiya salên 60an de bihêz dibû, bi hijmekarî bal û nezera xwe dabûne ser hereketa “Feda’îyên Felestînê” û ew wek mektebekê didîtin ji bo têkoşîna xwe ya paşerojê. Dawiya salên 60an, xwendekarên ciwan ên çepgir ên tirk û kurd çûne nav kempên gerîlayên Felestînê li Lubnanê da ku xwe ji bo têkoşîna çekdarî li Tirkiyeyê amade bikin. Ew têkilî piştî derbeya leşkerî ya 1980an li Tirkiyeyê hêj bihêztir bû û tesîreke mezin li hereketên radîkal ên tirk û kurd kir. Kempên Felestînê bûne stargehên girîng ji bo van komên tirk-kurd, ku ji nav wan herî zêde PKKyê sûd jê wergirt. PKKyê ev îmkan ne tenê ji bo perwerdeya leşkerî lê herwiha ji bo selihandin û biserxwedehatina xwe ya rêxistînî jî bi kar anî, ya ku ti yek ji hereketên tirk-kurd ên din nekarîbûn pêk bînin. Ev gotar dikeve pey têkiliya di navbera hereketên radîkal ên tirk-kurd û rêxistinên Felestînî de, lê bi taybetî li ser PKKyê hûr dibe, û nîşan dide ku PKKyê ji vê îmkanê wisa îstifade kiriye ku “Xewna Felestînê” li meydana kurdî pêk bîne.

Networks, Power, and the Effects of Legitimacy in Contentious Politics

“…In October 1979, Öcalan wrote to his collaborators in Turkey reporting that the DFLP would train PKK militants in Palestinian-run camps. Once recruits were sent to the camps, they were trained and provided monthly allowances, which were transferred directly to the PKK (Akkaya 2015; Marcus 2007).…”

“…In 1993, the PLO made a series of political concessions, leading to its official recognition by Israel as the representative of the Palestinian people. During this process, the DFLP’s activities shifted significantly, and by September 1992, material support for the PKK ended (Akkaya 2015).…”

Die Entwicklung der kurdischen Freiheitsbewegung

“…Nach dem Putsch von 1980 reorganisierte sich die PKK in einiger Entfernung vom Kriegsschauplatz. Sie knüpfte Kontakte zu palästinensischen Organisationen, die sich bereit erklärten, sie im Libanon auszubilden (Akkaya 2015). Später, Mitte der 1980er Jahre, übernahm die PKK ein ehemaliges Ausbildungslager einer palästinensischen Organisation im libanesischen Beka'a-Tal.…”

Palestinian and Kurdish nationalism: Understanding the ‘politics of the possible’

“…1 1 While not a focus of the present article, a good historical overview of the interactions between the two movements and the impact of the Palestinian Fedayeen movement on leftist Turkish‐Kurdish students from the 1960s to the 1980s can be found in Akkaya (2015). …”

“…While not a focus of the present article, a good historical overview of the interactions between the two movements and the impact of the Palestinian Fedayeen movement on leftist Turkish-Kurdish students from the 1960s to the 1980s can be found inAkkaya (2015).2 These numbers are based on the CIA Factbook for the West Bank and Gaza; UNRWA and Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics data for Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon; and the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics for Israel and the rest of the world. 3 Unless otherwise specified, when we refer to Kurds we are discussing the Syrian Kurds.…”