The Paradigm Case Argument: its use and abuse in education

Abstract

The search for patterns is basic to all academic disciplines. In the case of philosophy, forms of valid argument are sought. To many followers of Moore and Wittgenstein, the Paradigm Case Argument looked like a fine specimen. Thorny problems of metaphysics could be solved, or dissolved, it was said, by appealing to the standards of ordinary linguistic practice. The argument was exhibited as a means of showing, for example, that material objects do exist, that we can be certain of empirical propositions, and that men do have free will. Critics responded with objections and a heated debate ensued. In the years between 1953 and 1962, the nature, use and validity of the PCA were widely discussed [I]. Since then, those philosophers in sympathy with the ordinary language school of linguistic philosophy have continued to employ the PCA as though it were logically impeccable. Particularly keen users of the PCA are, and have been, analytic philosophers of education. Influential examples are Israel Scheffler, Antony Flew, John White and Robin Barrow: the first used the PCA in urging adoption of his still respected conception of teaching and the other three have used it in promoting their views on indoctrination. The importance of the basic strategy in educational arguments makes a fresh look at the PCA essential. A grasp of the debates which initially inspired it, and the limitations placed upon its use, will enable us to assess the PCA's application in philosophy of education. A confused and untenable argument from the start, rejection of the PCA in new contexts for which it was never intended is, I shall argue, justified and desirable.