The paradox of public participation in fisheries governance. The rising number of actors and the devolution process

Vivero, Juan Luís Suárez de; Mateos, Juan Carlos Rodrı́guez; Corral, David Florido del

doi:10.1016/j.marpol.2007.06.005

Cited by 70 publications

(29 citation statements)

References 23 publications

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“…Thus a balance between efficiency, accountability and legitimacy has to be found (Jentoft and McCay 1995;Yandle 2007). Also devolution can result in a 'participation paradox ': de Vivero et al (2008) point out that including more stakeholders eventually decreases the importance of the single actor. Thus, "greater devolution does not necessarily result in greater participation" (de Vivero et al 2008: 320).…”

Section: Adaptive Co-management and Fisheriesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Improving or overturning the ITQ system? Views of stakeholders in Icelandic fisheries

Kokorsch

Karlsdóttir²,

Benediktsson

2015

Maritime Studies

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Icelandic fisheries have gone through tremendous changes since the 1980s and the gradual implementation of individual transferable quotas. The paper investigates to what extent the power of different stakeholders in the fisheries management system has changed, and examines whether and in which fields enhanced participation is favoured by relevant stakeholder groups. Strengths and weaknesses of participation within the system are scrutinized and alternatives assessed. The analytical framework stems from the concept of adaptive co-management, whereas the empirical data derives from a survey on Icelandic fisheries management among important stakeholder groups. This survey showed that the critique of individual transferable quotas is not homogeneous. Regional differences are present regarding the evaluation of the current regime, but also of proposed alternative management instruments. Overall, more stakeholder participation, especially in data gathering and decision making, is demanded. This has in fact decreased over time. The authors suggest that the perceived shortcomings of the quota system in general and the lack of stakeholder participation in particular, can be addressed by adopting certain elements of adaptive co-management.

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Section: Adaptive Co-management and Fisheriesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Improving or overturning the ITQ system? Views of stakeholders in Icelandic fisheries

Kokorsch

Karlsdóttir²,

Benediktsson

2015

Maritime Studies

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“…Co-governance certainly adds legitimacy to decision making processes, since varied interest groups are represented albeit unequally. However, participation from multiple interest groups adds complexity to the system and hence increases the potential for confl ict and reduces the possibility of cooperation (Suárez de Vivero et al 2008 ).…”

Section: The "Perfect" Governance Modementioning

confidence: 99%

Two Rules for the Same Fish: Small-Scale Fisheries Governance in Mainland Ecuador and Galapagos Islands

Paladines

2015

MARE Publication Series

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The small-scale fi sheries sector in the Ecuador mainland and Galapagos Islands face major challenges triggered by large scale human and climatic events, which compromise their sustainability. Lack of trust, leadership and cohesion among small-scale fi sheries entities, limited organizational skills, and social problems within fi shing communities reduce this sector's governability. Further, lack of willingness of fi shers to observe rules, limited governing capacity and lack of political attention to small-scale fi sheries often contribute to making the overall system less governable. According to interactive governance theory, different governing modes would be suitable for different systems, depending also on the types and quality of governing interactions. Using the interactive governance framework, this chapter explores the performance of the hierarchical and co-governance mode for small-scale fi sheries governance in the Ecuador mainland and Galapagos Islands, respectively. These two case studies, by using empirical evidence and triangulationbased methods, analyze the small-scale fi sheries sector and some mechanisms through which the governing system, the system-to-be-governed, and governing interactions are operating. The chapter highlights that both hierarchical and cogovernance modes of governance have underperformed and consequently that their governability has been reduced for three main reasons: the mismatch between legal frameworks, the undefi ned social system's borders, and the use of inappropriate mechanisms for information mobilization. The chapter concludes by suggesting that both models need to contribute to national initiatives, to strength the social system, and to increase the small-scale fi sheries sector governability. Only then can fi sheries sustainability be achieved.

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“…Concern over the social dimension of sustainability has been expressed, for example, by the study of share capital in watersheds, fishing areas and natural parks (Grafton, 2005;Pretty, 2003). Among other social factors, communication patterns , leadership forms (Crona and Bodin, 2010), community participation (Jentoft, 2000;Pomeroy and Berkes, 1998;Suárez de Vivero, Rodríguez Mateos and Florido del Corral, 2008), organizational capacities (Folke et al, 2005), and the influence of formal and informal relationships between key actors (Bodin, Crona and Ernston, 2006;Prell et al, 2010) have been considered.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Redes entre dos mares: cofradías y armadores en los caladeros atlántico y mediterráneo de Andalucía

Jariego¹,

Ramos²,

Corral³

et al. 2024

REIS

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ResumenDescribimos la red organizativa del sector extractivo en los enclaves pesqueros andaluces. Para ello evaluamos 6 tipos de relaciones informales e institucionales entre 30 cofradías y asociaciones de armadores de 21 puertos pesqueros de Andalucía. Las redes analizadas responden a una estructura centro-periferia, con un rol central de las cofradías. Con el procedimiento QAP diferenciamos dos contextos para la formación de relaciones: los encuentros informales y la red de gestión de asuntos pesqueros, que se corresponde con encuentros formales, tales como las mesas de pesca, las asambleas de puerto o la negociación de cuotas pesqueras. Comprobamos la existencia de dinámicas de homofi lia por caladero de pesca y por tipo de organización. Key wordsSocial AbstractThis study examines the organizational network of the extractive sector in Andalusian fi shing enclaves. For this, we have evaluated 6 types of informal and institutional relationships between a total of 30 guilds and ship-owner associations in 21 Andalusian fi shing ports. The analyzed networks were found to have a core-periphery structure with the guilds playing a central role. The QAP procedure was used to identify two distinct contexts of relationship formation: informal meetings and the government fi shing network (corresponding to formal meetings, such as fi shing tables, port assemblies and fi shing quota negotiations). We verifi ed the existence of signifi cant homophily dynamics based on both fi shing ground and organization type. Cómo citarMaya-Jariego, Isidro; Holgado, Daniel; Florido del Corral, David y Martínez de Alba, Inmaculada (2016). «Redes entre dos mares: cofradías y armadores en los caladeros atlántico y mediterráneo de Andalucía». Revista Española de Investigaciones Sociológicas, 114Redes entre dos mares: cofradías y armadores en los caladeros atlántico y mediterráneo de Andalucía INTRODUCCIÓN 1 La gobernanza de los recursos naturales y, por ende, la comprensión de los sistemas socio-ecológicos han suscitado un enorme interés en los últimos años (Alegret, 2002; Berkes y Folke, 1998; Berkes, Colding y Folke, 2003; Carlsson y Berkes, 2005; Sanz Ló-pez y Torres Rodríguez, 2006). La preocupación por la dimensión social de la sostenibilidad se ha expresado, por ejemplo, en el estudio del capital social en cuencas hidrográfi cas, zonas pesqueras y parques naturales (Grafton, 2005;Pretty, 2003). Entre otros factores sociales, se han tenido en cuenta los patrones de comunicación (Crona y Bodin, 2006), las formas de liderazgo (Crona y Bodin, 2010), la participación de la comunidad (Jentoft, 2000; Pomeroy y Berkes, 1997; Suárez de Vivero, Rodríguez Mateos y Florido del Corral, 2008), las capacidades organizativas (Folke et al., 2005) y la infl uencia de las relaciones formales e informales entre actores clave (Bodin, Crona y Ernston, 2006;Prell et. al., 2010).En el caso concreto de la gestión de recursos pesqueros, la investigación se ha centrado especialmente en las formas de gobernanza participativa y sostenible (Carlson y Berkes, 20...

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The paradox of public participation in fisheries governance. The rising number of actors and the devolution process

Cited by 70 publications

References 23 publications

Improving or overturning the ITQ system? Views of stakeholders in Icelandic fisheries

Improving or overturning the ITQ system? Views of stakeholders in Icelandic fisheries

Two Rules for the Same Fish: Small-Scale Fisheries Governance in Mainland Ecuador and Galapagos Islands

Redes entre dos mares: cofradías y armadores en los caladeros atlántico y mediterráneo de Andalucía

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