The particularity of photographic experience

Abstract

A common view in the philosophy of perception holds that states of seeing objects face to face have particular contents. When you see, say, a dog face to face, your visual state represents the particular dog that is in front of you. In this paper, I argue for a related claim about states of seeing objects in conventional photographs. When you see a dog in a photograph, for example, your visual state represents the particular dog that was in front of the camera when the photograph was taken, that is, the photograph's depictum. The argument in this paper proceeds in two steps. In the first step, I discuss states of seeing objects face to face. I argue that such a state represents the particular object whose surface is responsible for the optical information that the visual system uses to construct the state's attributive representational content. In the second step, I apply the result of this discussion to states of seeing objects in photographs. I argue that a state of seeing an object in a photograph has a particular content that represents the object that was in front of the camera when the photograph was taken.

A Democratic Theory of Life

“…This includes 'a blanket guarantee of economic rights, of sustainability for people, and that means healthcare, that means a home, that means strong work protections, a safety net for one's family'. 59 Beyond mere existence, 'a living democracy allows us to evolve', 60 by providing the means for self-realisation. In this sense, Woodly and Brown (2021) propose a politics of care, which breaks with the liberal-capitalist framework.…”