The partisan brain: An Identity-based model of political belief

Abstract

Democracies assume accurate knowledge by the populace, but the human attraction to fake and untrustworthy news poses a serious problem for healthy democratic functioning. We articulate why and how identification with political parties–known as partisanship–can bias information processing in the human brain. There is extensive evidence that people engage in motivated political reasoning, but recent research suggests that partisanship can even alter memory, implicit evaluation, and even perceptual judgments. We propose an identity-based model of belief for understanding the influence of partisanship on these cognitive processes. This framework helps explain why people place party loyalty over policy, and even truth. Finally, we discuss strategies for de-biasing information processing to help create a shared reality across partisan divides.

Political Psychology in the Digital (mis)Information age: A Model of News Belief and Sharing

“…When partisans are exposed to information relevant to a cherished social identity or ideological worldview, that information is often interpreted in a biased manner that reinforces original predispositions—a phenomenon known as partisan bias (Kahan et al., 2017; Meffert et al., 2006; Van Bavel & Pereira, 2018). For example, someone who believes in the death penalty might give less weight to information suggesting that the death penalty does not reduce crime.…”

“…When people process information, they are influenced not only by the information itself but by a variety of motives, such as self‐, group‐, and system‐serving goals (Jost et al., 2013; Van Bavel & Pereira, 2018). Theories that incorporate these goals, referred to as motivational models, posit that when individuals encounter false information that identity congruent (i.e., untrue positive information about the in‐group or untrue negative information about an outgroup) their identity‐based motives (e.g., the desire to believe information that makes us feel positive about our group) will conflict with accuracy motives (e.g., the desire to have accurate beliefs about the world; Tomz & Van Houweling, 2008; Van Bavel & Pereira, 2018). In other words, when a Republican in the United States encounters a fake online news story from an unknown source with the headline “Pope Francis shocks World, endorses Donald Trump for President,” their accuracy goals might motivate them to dismiss the story (because it is false or from an untrustworthy source) but their social identity goals would motivate them to believe that it is true (because it is positive and about their in‐group leader).…”

Using social and behavioural science to support COVID-19 pandemic response

“…Attitudinal polarization' concerns partisans taking extreme opposing issue positions, whereas 'affective polarization' refers to partisans disliking and distrusting those from the opposing party(ies) 87,88 . Affective polarization has political consequences, such as decreasing trust 89 , privileging partisan labels over policy information 90 and believing false information 91 , that can undermine social and economic relationships 88 and impair public health.…”

Breaking groupthink: Why scientific identity and norms mitigate ideological epistemology

“…1 Nevertheless, we believe that dispositional and situational factors could make scientists less susceptible to partisan biases--especially during their scientific decision-making. People who have a disposition to seek out and consume scientific information are far less partisan (Kahan et al, 2017), and those who possess an identity that is premised on generating accurate beliefs, like "scientists, investigative journalists, and jurors" should be more likely to hold accurate beliefs (Van Bavel & Pereira, 2018). Indeed, scientists tend to require greater empirical consistency than non-scientists (Hogan & Maglienti, 2001).…”