The Perils of Path Dependency: Germany's Russia Policy

Spanger, Hans-Joachim

doi:10.4324/9781003304647-8

Cited by 3 publications

(2 citation statements)

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“…As other states had sent weapons to Ukraine and signalled large-scale retaliation, it seems worthwhile to explore why Germany (and others) adopted different policies. The results of this study and others (Spanger 2020;Driedger 2022) suggest that this is a combination of path dependency on widespread beliefs in the disutility of military measures to promote peace, the rapid and militarised way in which events developed, and short-term factors such as dynamics within the newly formed three-party coalition in Germany.…”

Section: Discussionsupporting

confidence: 49%

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Did Germany Contribute to Deterrence Failure against Russia in Early 2022?

Driedger

2022

CEJISS

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With signs of Russia’s aggressive intentions mounting since Fall 2021, Ukraine and NATO allies criticised Germany for not sufficiently contributing to Western efforts at deterring a Russian invasion. The article evaluates this claim by applying deterrence theory and using congruence analysis on foundational policy documents, expert literature and interviews of Russian and Western policymakers. It establishes that states contribute to collective extended deterrence the more they have the capabilities to harm assets that are highly valued by the revisionist and the more the revisionist has reasons to believe that these capabilities would be used if it enacted aggression. The article then evaluates Germany’s potential deterrence contributions, establishing that Germany’s vast arms industry and economic clout allowed it to significantly threaten the Russian regime through economic destabilisation and prospects of high-casualty fighting. It then gauges Germany’s actual deterrence contributions, finding them to have been significantly smaller: Germany deliberately avoided military threats and deliveries of arms to Ukraine. And while Germany did early on threaten to use its significant economic clout against Russia, it remained vague and non-committal over core issues of Russian economic interests, such as the Nord Stream 2 pipeline system. The results provide and inform further hypotheses on the causes of German behaviour and indirect influences on deterrence against Russia. They also urge reconsiderations of strategic thinking in Berlin and elsewhere.

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Section: Discussionsupporting

confidence: 49%

“…By its Central and Eastern European allies, Germany was long considered the most important and least reliable European state when it came to Russia (Stewart 2013;Spanger 2020;Szabo 2015). This dual perception became especially salient in late 2021 to early 2022.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%