“…In the second sub-period, for the inclusion of the declaration in the 1884 SCC, it performs much less well than might first appear. In the conference negotiations not one state objected to the principle that the convention applied only in peacetime; debate was mainly about the peculiar, rather legalistic design of the British -almost certainly British FO Permanent Under-Secretary, Sir Julian Pauncefote's (a lawyer with no Admiralty or War Office experience: Neilson and Otte, 2009: 62-67) -draft clause, written and presented at a very late stage (Pauncefote, PUS FO, to Government Law Officers, 24.1.1883, PRO 30/29/359), which had attracted little enthusiasm even in the Foreign Office (Kennedy, FO delegate to the conference and the influential head of the FO's Commercial Department, memo, 8.12.1883, PRO 30/29/359) and none elsewhere (Bateman Champain, Director of the Indian Telegraph Service, memo 15.11.1883, PRO 30/29/359 provided a pointed critique); even in the Admiralty and War Office who were informed at a late stage and merely noted that the draft clause would meet the Foreign Office's (FO's) (rather than their) objectives, and neither military department had been consulted on it nor thought it necessary, let alone strategically important (Tryon, Admiralty, to Fitzmaurice, FO, 14.1.1884, PRO 30/29/359). In inter-departmental exchanges in preparation and at the conference, much more contentious were issues about court jurisdictions, fishing interests, signals for cable repairing ships and so on.…”