The Persistence of Erroneous Information in Memory: The Effect of Valence on the Acceptance of Corrected Information

Guillory, Jimmeka J.; Geraci, Lisa

doi:10.1002/acp.3183

Cited by 33 publications

(16 citation statements)

References 30 publications

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“…Although false belief is reduced relative to individuals exposed to the misinformation without retraction, it remains greater than for individuals who were never exposed to the misinformation. This continued influence effect generalizes to other stimuli, including scientific journal articles (Greitemeyer, 2014), political information (Guillory & Geraci, 2013, 2015; Lewandowsky et al, 2005), and other fictional news stories (Ecker et al, 2017; Ecker, Lewandowsky, & Apai, 2011; Johnson & Seifert, 1998).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 72%

Correcting the unknown: Negated corrections may increase belief in misinformation

Autry

Duarte

2021

Applied Cognitive Psychology

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Corrections are not always effective at reducing belief in misinformation. Negated corrections, which state a piece of information is not true, may only be effective at inhibiting information an observer has already encountered. We compared the effectiveness of negated corrections and replacements while manipulating initial exposure to a target concept. Subjects read one (Experiment 1) or six (Experiment 2) passages presenting a target concept (e.g., blue car) or not, followed by a negated correction (e.g., not blue), replacement (e.g., red), or no correction, then answered open-ended questions which were scored for mentions of the target concept. When subjects were exposed to the target concept, negated corrections reduced mentions of the misinformation relative to no correction; however, when not exposed to the concept, negated corrections increased mentions relative to no correction. These results demonstrate that negated corrections can increase belief in misinformation when observers have not been exposed to the misinformation.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 72%

Correcting the unknown: Negated corrections may increase belief in misinformation

Autry

Duarte

2021

Applied Cognitive Psychology

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“…However, there is also evidence to suggest that negative information is in general somewhat more attentiondemanding (Rozin & Royzman, 2001). For example, Guillory and Geraci (2016) found that unselected participants demonstrated a negativity bias, preferentially referring to negative information regardless of a retraction. However, the inference questions in Guillory and Geraci's study differed across scenarios in their potential to elicit references to the critical information, so methodological artifacts might have contributed to this finding; in the current study, we addressed this by matching questions across scenarios as closely as possible.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…A second, independent scorer coded 40 randomly selected questionnaires (5 per condition) in order to calculate inter-rater reliability, which was high, r = .91. Following ample precedent (e.g.,Ecker & Ang, 2018;Ecker, Hogan, & Lewandowsky, 2017;Guillory & Geraci, 2016), scoring of inference questions was based on references made to the critical piece of information. Responses to open-ended inference questions were scored 1 if there was any uncontroverted reference made to the critical information, and 0 otherwise.…”

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confidence: 99%

Not wallowing in misery – retractions of negative misinformation are effective in depressive rumination

Chang

Ecker

Page

2018

Cognition and Emotion

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People often continue to rely on misinformation in their reasoning after they have acknowledged a retraction; this phenomenon is known as the continued-influence effect. Retractions can be particularly ineffective when the retracted misinformation is consistent with a pre-existing worldview. We investigated this effect in the context of depressive rumination. Given the prevalence of depressotypic worldviews in depressive rumination, we hypothesised that depressive rumination may affect the processing of retractions of valenced misinformation; specifically, we predicted that the retraction of negative misinformation might be less effective in depressive ruminators. In two experiments, we found evidence against this hypothesis: in depressive ruminators, retractions of negative misinformation were at least as effective as they were in control participants, and more effective than retractions of positive misinformation. Findings are interpreted in terms of an attentional bias that may enhance the salience of negative misinformation and may thus facilitate its updating in depressive rumination.

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“…The continued-influence effect of misinformation refers to the consistent finding that misinformation continues to influence people’s beliefs and reasoning even after it has been corrected (Chan, Jones, Hall Jamieson, & Albarracín, 2017; Ecker, Lewandowsky, & Apai, 2011b; Ecker, Lewandowsky, Swire, & Chang, 2011a; Ecker, Lewandowsky, & Tang, 2010; Gordon, Brooks, Quadflieg, Ecker, & Lewandowsky, 2017; Guillory & Geraci, 2016; Johnson & Seifert, 1994; Rich & Zaragoza, 2016; Wilkes & Leatherbarrow, 1988; for a review, see Lewandowsky, Ecker, Seifert, Schwarz, & Cook, 2012). Misinformation can have a lasting effect on people’s reasoning, even when they demonstrably remember that the information has been corrected (Johnson & Seifert, 1994) and are given prior warnings about the persistence of misinformation (Ecker et al, 2010).…”

Section: The Continued-influence Effectmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…With only a few exceptions (Guillory & Geraci, 2013, 2016; Rich & Zaragoza, 2016), research concerning reliance on misinformation has used open-ended questions administered in the lab (see Capella, Ophir, & Sutton, 2018, for an overview of approaches to measuring misinformation beliefs). There are several good reasons for using such questions, particularly on memory-based tasks that involve the comprehension or recall of previously studied text.…”

Section: Using Open- and Closed-ended Questions Onlinementioning

confidence: 99%

Comparing the use of open and closed questions for Web-based measures of the continued-influence effect

Desai

Reimers

2018

Behav Res

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Open-ended questions, in which participants write or type their responses, are used in many areas of the behavioral sciences. Although effective in the lab, they are relatively untested in online experiments, and the quality of responses is largely unexplored. Closed-ended questions are easier to use online because they generally require only single key- or mouse-press responses and are less cognitively demanding, but they can bias the responses. We compared the data quality obtained using open and closed response formats using the continued-influence effect (CIE), in which participants read a series of statements about an unfolding event, one of which is unambiguously corrected later. Participants typically continue to refer to the corrected misinformation when making inferential statements about the event. We implemented this basic procedure online (Exp. 1A, n = 78), comparing standard open-ended responses to an alternative procedure using closed-ended responses (Exp. 1B, n = 75). Finally, we replicated these findings in a larger preregistered study (Exps. 2A and 2B, n = 323). We observed the CIE in all conditions: Participants continued to refer to the misinformation following a correction, and their references to the target misinformation were broadly similar in number across open- and closed-ended questions. We found that participants' open-ended responses were relatively detailed (including an average of 75 characters for inference questions), and almost all responses attempted to address the question. The responses were faster, however, for closed-ended questions. Overall, we suggest that with caution it may be possible to use either method for gathering CIE data.

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The Persistence of Erroneous Information in Memory: The Effect of Valence on the Acceptance of Corrected Information

Cited by 33 publications

References 30 publications

Correcting the unknown: Negated corrections may increase belief in misinformation

Correcting the unknown: Negated corrections may increase belief in misinformation

Not wallowing in misery – retractions of negative misinformation are effective in depressive rumination

Comparing the use of open and closed questions for Web-based measures of the continued-influence effect

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