The Persistent Effect of Temporary Affirmative Action

Abstract

I estimate the dynamic effects of federal affirmative action regulation, exploiting variation in the timing of regulation and deregulation across work establishments. Affirmative action increases the black share of employees over time: in 5 years after an establishment is first regulated, the black share of employees increases by an average of 0.8 percentage points. Strikingly, the black share continues to grow at a similar pace even after an establishment is deregulated. I argue that this persistence is driven in part by affirmative action inducing employers to improve their methods for screening potential hires. (JEL J15, J23, J24, J83, K31)

Hysteresis in Employment among Disadvantaged Workers

“…In addition, the employment of these populations tends to be more procyclical, so any change in overall labor market conditions may have a larger effect on them (Hoynes, 2000;Hines et al, 2001;Devereux, 2002). Finally, if the disadvantaged population of interest is one that faces discrimination in the labor market, higher levels of employment mean greater direct exposure of employers to the disadvantaged group, which may reduce discrimination (Boisjoly et al, 2006;Miller, 2017). Our baseline specifications define prime-age men with no more than a high school education as the disadvantaged population.…”

Ban the Box, Convictions, and Public Employment

“…Therefore, impact estimates from general and event‐study DDD specifications suggest that public employers do not engage in statistical discrimination in response to BTB policies. This buttresses the literature showing persistent effects of anti‐discrimination legislation in the public sector (Cooper et al ; Dale and Division ; Miller ; Miller and Segal ).…”

“…However, like much of the existing literature on statistical discrimination (e.g., Autor and Scarborough 2008;Holzer et al 2006;Wozniak 2015), these studies best characterize the private sector, which has great discretion in recruitment and hiring practices. Public employers on the other hand, may be less inclined to engage in statistical discrimination because of sticky recruitment, screening, and hiring conventions (e.g., Kurtulus 2016;Miller 2017;Miller and Segal 2012).…”

“…Rodgers and Spriggs () found that federal‐contractor status raised the share of African Americans employed in these establishments in the 1980s and 1990s. This e x post compliance with antidiscrimination policies is likely explained by “partially irreversible” recruitment and screening reforms (Miller ) as well as the potential elimination of negative stereotypes (Coate and Loury ).…”

“…Prior studies that find evidence to support statistical discrimination (e.g., Agan and Starr ; Autor and Scarborough ; Doleac and Hansen ; Holzer et al ; Wozniak ) largely characterize the private sector, where there is considerable discretion in recruitment and hiring decisions. In the public sector however, it is unclear whether statistical discrimination can co‐exist with persistent anti‐discrimination practices (Cooper et al ; Dale and Division ; Miller ; Miller and Segal ). As such, my study provides an exclusive test of statistical discrimination in the public sector.…”