The Personal Vote and the Efficacy of Education Spending

Hicken, Allen; Simmons, Joel W.

doi:10.1111/j.1540-5907.2007.00302.x

Cited by 82 publications

(63 citation statements)

References 43 publications

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“…In particular, cohesion among elites is enhanced, allowing party leaders to resolve coordination problems among themselves -striking deals that involve intertemporal tradeoffs and enforcing those deals through time (Boix & Svolik 2013;Hicken & Simmons 2008;Kuhonta 2011;Magaloni 2006;McGillivray 1997;Müller 2000;Nielson 2003;Svolik 2012;Tommasi 2006). Focusing on democratic settings, Gerring & Thacker (2008: 36-37) propose that "wherever parties are weak, policies are necessarily the product of ad hoc coalitions and individual interests," whereas a strong party "synchronizes individual career goals with the party's quest for political power."…”

Section: Theorymentioning

confidence: 99%

Party Strength and Economic Growth

Bizzarro¹,

Gerring²,

Knutsen³

et al. 2018

World Pol.

Self Cite

101

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Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) is a new approach to the conceptualization and measurement of democracy. It is co-hosted by the University of Gothenburg and University of Notre Dame. With a V-Dem Institute at University of Gothenburg that comprises almost ten staff members, and a project team across the world with four Principal Investigators, fifteen Project Managers, 30+ Regional Managers, 170 Country Coordinators, Research Assistants, and 2,500 Country Experts, the V-Dem project is one of the largest-ever social science research-oriented data collection programs.Please address comments and/or queries for information to: AbstractWhile a large literature suggests an important role for political parties in economic development, this is the first attempt to lay out a comprehensive theory and a reasonably comprehensive empirical test of the proposition. We argue that strong parties broaden the constituencies to which policy makers respond and help politicians solve coordination problems. These features help ensure better economic management, public services, and political stability. And this, in turn, enhances economic growth.Drawing on a novel measure of party strength from the Varieties of Democracy dataset, we test this theory on data drawn from more than 150 countries, observed annually from 1900-2012. We identify a sizeable effect which is robust to various specifications, estimators, and samples. The effect operates in both democracies and autocracies and is fairly stable across regions and time periods. We also find provisional evidence in favor of causal mechanisms pertaining to public services and political stability.4

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Section: Theorymentioning

confidence: 99%

Party Strength and Economic Growth

Bizzarro¹,

Gerring²,

Knutsen³

et al. 2018

World Pol.

Self Cite

101

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“…1 Other research has examined the "demand" side of vote buying to determine which voters are most likely to prefer receiving payments from candidates as opposed to broad-based public policies (Shin 2015). Underlying much of this research is a presumption that the practice of vote buying undermines government effectiveness (Hicken and Simmons 2008) and is normatively antithetical to classic conceptions of democracy. Government agencies such as the Komisi Pemilihan Umum (or KPU) and the Kesatuan Bangsadan Politik (or Kesbangpol) spend considerable time and energy attempting to reduce the practice by distributing pamphlets to citizens and holding public events discouraging citizens from voting for candidates who offer gifts in exchange for their votes.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Consistency and Vote Buying: Income, Education, and Attitudes About Vote Buying in Indonesia

Tawakkal¹,

Wisnu²,

Garner³

et al. 2017

J. East Asian Stud.

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This article examines ambivalence-the simultaneous holding of two or more conflicting values or beliefs about a political issue-among Indonesian citizens' attitudes about vote buying. Using an original survey taken during the 2014 Indonesian elections, we analyse the factors related both to citizens' normative views about vote buying and their willingness to accept gifts from candidates. A large number of citizens demonstrate ambivalence by viewing the practice as unjustified or corrupt and yet expressing willingness to accept money from candidates. We also examine the differential effects of education and income on these attitudes. Consistent with "demand side" theories of vote buying, low income creates economic pressure to accept money but does not influence normative attitudes about vote buying. Education, however, has a broader effect by influencing both normative attitudes and willingness to accept money. We consider implications of these results for Indonesian officials focused on reducing vote-buying behavior.

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“…2010;Desposato 2007). Finally, vote-buying and other forms of clientelism are associated with larger public deficits and public sector inefficiencies (Keefer 2006;Keefer 2007;Hicken and Simmons 2008), and higher levels of corruption (Singer 2009;Keefer 2007;Kitschelt 2007;Kitschelt et. al.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Temptation in vote-selling: Evidence from a field experiment in the Philippines

Hicken

Leider

Ravanilla

et al. 2018

Journal of Development Economics

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. An electronic version of the paper may be downloaded Terms of use: Documents in EconStor may• from the SSRN website:www. SSRN.com • from the RePEc website:www. RePEc.org • from the CESifo website:T www. CESifo-group.org/wpT CESifo Working Paper No. 4828 Temptation in Vote-Selling: Evidence from a Field Experiment in the Philippines AbstractWe test the predictions of a behavioral model of transactional electoral politics in the context of a randomized anti-vote-selling intervention in the Philippines. We model selling one's vote as a temptation good: it creates positive utility for the future self at the moment of voting, but not for past selves who anticipate the vote-sale. We also allow keeping or breaking promises regarding vote-selling to affect utility. Voters who are at least partially sophisticated about their vote-selling temptation can thus use promises not to vote-sell as a commitment device. An invitation to promise not to vote-sell is taken up by a majority of respondents, reduces vote-selling, and has a larger effect in electoral races with smaller vote-buying payments. The more effective promise treatment reduces vote-selling in the smallest-stakes election by 10.9 percentage points. Inviting voters to make another type of promise -to accept vote-buying payments, but to nonetheless "vote your conscience" -is significantly less effective. The results are consistent with voters being partially (but not fully) sophisticated about their voteselling temptation.JEL-Code: D030, D720, O120.Keywords: vote-selling, vote-buying, temptation, self-control, commitment, elections, political economy, Philippines. We thank Joma Gonzalez (Innovations for Poverty Action) for unparalleled field management, Vibha Mehta for her contributions to the field work and analysis, and seminar participants at Georgia Institute of Technology, Simon Fraser University, University of British Columbia, the World Bank, and Georgetown University. This study was made possible by funding from the MCubed program at the University of Michigan. 1 Allen Hicken Department of Political IntroductionVote-buying and vote-selling are pervasive phenomena in many developing democracies. While there is some debate about the consequences of the buying and selling of votes, there is a consensus that transactional electoral politics brings with it a host of costs. For example, vote-buying and other forms of clientelism can undermine or even reverse the standard accountability relations...

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The Personal Vote and the Efficacy of Education Spending

Cited by 82 publications

References 43 publications

Party Strength and Economic Growth

Party Strength and Economic Growth

Consistency and Vote Buying: Income, Education, and Attitudes About Vote Buying in Indonesia

Temptation in vote-selling: Evidence from a field experiment in the Philippines

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