The Persuasion Duality

Dworczak, Piotr; Kolotilin, Anton

doi:10.2139/ssrn.3474376

Cited by 11 publications

(14 citation statements)

References 17 publications

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“…DACC (Dworczak 2016) is the only known fair procedure that provably terminates, albeit in O(n 4 ), with extra measures required to ensure termination (Dworczak 2019), fol-lowing an arbitrary sequence of proposals. Thus, no known fair procedure has less than quartic time.…”

Section: Procedural Fairnessmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Fair Procedures for Fair Stable Marriage Outcomes

Tziavelis

Giannakopoulos

Johansen

et al. 2020

AAAI

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Given a two-sided market where each agent ranks those on the other side by preference, the stable marriage problem calls for finding a perfect matching such that no pair of agents prefer each other to their matches. Recent studies show that the number of stable solutions can be large in practice. Yet the classical solution to the problem, the Gale-Shapley (GS) algorithm, assigns an optimal match to each agent on one side, and a pessimal one to each on the other side; such a solution may fare well in terms of equity only in highly asymmetric markets. Finding a stable matching that minimizes the sex equality cost, an equity measure expressing the discrepancy of mean happiness among the two sides, is strongly NP-hard. Extant heuristics either (a) oblige some agents to involuntarily abandon their matches, or (b) bias the outcome in favor of some agents, or (c) need high-polynomial or unbounded time.We provide the first procedurally fair algorithms that output equitable stable marriages and are guaranteed to terminate in at most cubic time; the key to this breakthrough is the monitoring of a monotonic state function and the use of a selective criterion for accepting proposals. Our experiments with diverse simulated markets show that: (a) extant heuristics fail to yield high equity; (b) the best solution found by the GS algorithm can be very far from optimal equity; and (c) our procedures stand out in both efficiency and equity, even when compared to a non-procedurally fair approximation scheme.

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Section: Procedural Fairnessmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…We call the use of this criterion discontent suspension. We have determined that DACC can also employ discontent suspension instead of more convoluted processes to ensure termination (Dworczak 2019).…”

Section: Revising the Acceptance Criterionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Fair Procedures for Fair Stable Marriage Outcomes

Tziavelis

Giannakopoulos

Johansen

et al. 2020

AAAI

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“…Despite of that, we manage to find rather mild and natural conditions that ensure the optimality of transparency without setting any restrictions on possible persuasion strategies. Differently from several recent papers (Dworczak and Kolotilin (2019), Dworczak and Martini (2019), Gentzkow and Kamenica (2016), Kolotilin (2018), Kolotilin et al (2021), Arieli et al ( 2020)), we provide conditions that speak directly to the underlying incentives of the agent, as opposed to the indirect utility function of the principal, and we do not assume that the sender's (principal's) payoff is a function of the expected state (or any moments of the posterior distribution). Specifically, we consider any situation where both the principal and the agent derive some utility from a project, and the agent's material utility is an increasing, weakly concave transformation of the principal's, but the agent also has to pay a cost of effort.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…2 As mentioned, differently from us, they give conditions in terms of the sender's indirect utility function, abstracting away from the underlying economic problem. 3 We focus instead on a (broad) class of economic problems, but without any restriction on how the state affects utilities. More importantly, we directly look for conditions in terms of the utility function of 1 Our results may be interpreted under the view that the reward scheme has been fixed for long time, while the information structure can be adapted to the project.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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On the optimality of full disclosure

Catonini¹,

Степанов²

2022

Preprint

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When is transparency optimal in principal-agent relationships? We consider the following setting. The principal has private, payoff-relevant information about the potential of the project. She can share this information with the agent and can commit to any information structure. Positive news motivate the agent, while bad news depress effort. Under rather mild and natural restrictions on the utility functions of the parties, we obtain interpretable and easily verifiable sufficient conditions for the optimality of full disclosure. We also show that full disclosure is optimal under some modeling assumptions commonly used in applied principal-agent papers.

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