The Philosopher as Polyphemus?

Halbig, Christoph

doi:10.1515/9783110179545.261

Cited by 3 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 0 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Unclassified

Order By: Relevance

“…That Hegel is not an idealist in the straightforwardly objectionable sense has not gone unnoticed. For instance, some interpreters of his philosophy of mind (what Hegel calls the philosophy of ‘subjective spirit’), such as Willem de Vries (1988) and Christoph Halbig (2002, 2005), have urged that Hegel is actually in the line of business of defending a form of realism on the basis of an account of perception designed precisely to avoid what is commonly called ‘idealism’. This account of Hegel’s philosophy of mind is paralleled by a recent debate about how to read Hegel’s relation to metaphysics.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

What Kind of an Idealist (If Any) Is Hegel?

Gabriel¹

2016

Hegel Bulletin

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

In this paper, I first explore Hegel’s own distinctions between various types of idealism, most of which he explicitly rejects. I discuss his notions of subjective, transcendental and absolute idealism and present the outlines of his criticisms of the first two as well as the motivation behind his commitment to a version of absolute idealism. In particular, I argue that the latter does not share the defining features of what is now commonly called ‘idealism’, as Hegel neither denies the existence of an external world nor even holds that we can only somehow indirectly infer the truth of propositions about the external world from the structure of some given mental material. I give a basic account of what Hegel’s concept of ‘the absolute idea’ is about, which lies behind his absolute idealism. In this context, I maintain that it is crucial for our understanding of Hegel and of his potential relevance for contemporary metaphysics and epistemology that the absolute idea is precisely not a mental or ‘spiritual’ (geistig) entity. Rather, it amounts to a set of methodological assumptions designed to guarantee the overall intelligibility of what there is, regardless of its actual natural, social or more broadly normative structure.

show abstract

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

What Kind of an Idealist (If Any) Is Hegel?

Gabriel¹

2016

Hegel Bulletin

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…Für die politische Deutung dieses kranken Doppelsehens, sieheManent (2010, S. 274). Hobbes und Rousseau wollen den Menschen helfen, dieses von Augustinus vererbte christliche Doppelsehen (De civitate Dei) zu heilen (cf Brunel, 2014;Halbig, 2005;Henrich, 1993)…”

unclassified

Das Aufheben des Lebens im Begriff. Künstlichkeit und Verwandlung bei F. H. Jacobi

Brunel

2023

REK

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

In Briefe an Fichte (1799) wirft Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi der Spekulation vor, dem Nihilismus zu verfallen. Dabei betont er das Künstliche des wissenschaftlichen Verfahrens, das den Dualismus abschafft. Mit Anspielungen auf die alchimistische, poetische und die sophistische Kunst wird die ontologische Tragweite der Wissenschaft hinterfragt, denn „Selbst von unserem eigenen Daseyn haben wir ein Gefühl; aber keinen Begriff“. Im vorliegenden Artikel rückt die Frage nach der Imitation in den Mittelpunkt, weil der Logos und das Seiende das verborgene Hauptproblem sind. Die wissenschaftliche Operation besteht darin, das natürliche Seelenauge als unkörperliches Wahrnehmungsorgan auszustechen und die Menschen in Polypheme zu verwandeln.

show abstract

“…The interpretation of the unboundedness‐thesis offered here implies that McDowell's attempt to domesticate the Hegelian metaphor in a Wittgensteinian spirit as just a truism dressed up in high‐flown language (see MW : 27) ultimately fails. For an account of the different metaphilosophical approaches to the problem of realism in Hegel and McDowell see Halbig 2005.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Varieties of Nature in Hegel and McDowell

Halbig

2006

Eur J Philosophy

Self Cite

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

finden die Natur als ein Rätsel und Problem vor uns, das wir ebenso aufzulösen uns getrieben fü hlen, als wir davon abgestoen werden. Hegel, Enz. § 244Z 1 1.The idea of a second nature as the basis for a relaxed naturalism has a fair claim on being the master idea not only of McDowell's richly suggestive Mind and World but also of his papers on subjects as diverse as metaethics, epistemology, philosophy of language and the theory of value. Nevertheless the reader will look in vain for an elaborate theory of second nature in McDowell's work. This is no accident, of course: McDowell explicitly disavows the need to provide such a theory as incompatible with the status the concept of second nature carries in his argument: It is meant as a Wittgensteinian ladder which deserves no attention on its own but just serves as a conceptual tool which might help in emancipating us from traditional philosophical impasses. Or, to put it in McDowell's own words: 'Once my reminder of second nature has done its work, nature can drop out of my picture' (R: 277). 2 This paper's line of argument proceeds in two contrasting stages which include three steps respectively. The first wave is focused on McDowell and tries to substantiate the thesis that the concept of second nature lies at the heart of his philosophical position. In a first step, the way in which McDowell's way out of the epistemological oscillation between the Myth of the Given on the one hand, a frictionless coherentism on the other presupposes a reconception of nature, and the place of spontaneity within it is analysed. In a second step, McDowell's solution is explored and evaluated in contrast to three competing approaches to the problem discussed by McDowell. Finally attention will be drawn to the metaphilosophical status McDowell attributes to his conception of second nature. In all three steps we will observe that McDowell alludes to the work of Hegel at crucial joints in his line of argument.Hegel's philosophy in its turn enters centre stage in the second wave of the argument: In a first step, the problem Hegel discusses under the heading of 'second nature' ('zweite Natur') is distinguished from the question at stake in McDowell's distinction between first and second nature. Hegel faces these questions, as will be shown, in his discussion of the relation between Nature and

show abstract

The Philosopher as Polyphemus?

Cited by 3 publications

References 0 publications

What Kind of an Idealist (If Any) Is Hegel?

What Kind of an Idealist (If Any) Is Hegel?

Das Aufheben des Lebens im Begriff. Künstlichkeit und Verwandlung bei F. H. Jacobi

Varieties of Nature in Hegel and McDowell

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About