The Phoenix Effect of State Repression: Jewish Resistance during the Holocaust

Finkel, Evgeny

doi:10.1017/s000305541500009x

Cited by 94 publications

(41 citation statements)

References 72 publications

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“…For decades, political scientists have largely overlooked the Holocaust. However, following the recent micro-level turn in violence research (e.g., Kalyvas 2006), the discipline has witnessed a growing interest in the topic (Braun 2016; Dumitru and Johnson 2011; Finkel 2015; King 2012; Kopstein and Wittenberg 2011). The key feature of these new studies is their focus on sub-national variation.…”

Section: Case Selectionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Death Camp Eldorado: Political and Economic Effects of Mass Violence

Charnysh

Finkel

2017

Am Polit Sci Rev

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Transfer and redistribution of wealth accompany most violent conflicts throughout the world, yet the local-level political and economic effects of this phenomenon remain unexplored. We address this omission by examining the long-term impact on the surrounding communities of the Nazi death camp Treblinka in Poland, where nearly a million Jews were murdered. The assets of murdered Jews sometimes ended up in the hands of the local population. We are able to identify the enduring impact of these property transfers on local economic and political outcomes because the exact location of Treblinka was exogenous to the characteristics of surrounding communities. We find that communities located closer to the camp experienced a real estate boom but do not exhibit higher levels of economic and social development. These communities also showed higher support for an anti-Semitic party, the League of Polish Families. Our findings speak to an important but overlooked challenge to post-conflict reconstruction and reconciliation.

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Section: Case Selectionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Death Camp Eldorado: Political and Economic Effects of Mass Violence

Charnysh

Finkel

2017

Am Polit Sci Rev

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“…Nothing close to such consensus exists on the impact of indiscriminate mass repression. 2 Using equally plausible theories and empirical designs, past research has argued two seemingly conflicting points: indiscriminate repression induces obedience toward the perpetrator (Lyall, 2009;García-Ponce and Pasquale, 2015;Zhukov and Talibova, 2018;Young, 2018), or repression inflames adversarial sentiments and mobilizes opposition (Kocher, Pepinsky and Kalyvas, 2011;Balcells, 2012;Finkel, 2015;Lupu and Peisakhin, 2017;Rozenas, Schutte and Zhukov, 2017).…”

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confidence: 99%

Mass Repression and Political Loyalty: Evidence from Stalin’s ‘Terror by Hunger’

2019

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States use repression to enforce obedience, but repression -especially if it is violent, massive, and indiscriminate -often incites opposition. Why does repression have such disparate effects? We address this question by studying the political legacy of Stalin's coercive agricultural policy and collective punishment campaign in Ukraine, which led to the death by starvation of over three million people in 1932-34. Using rich micro-level data on eight decades of local political behavior, we find that communities exposed to Stalin's "terror by hunger" behaved more loyally toward Moscow when the regime could credibly threaten retribution in response to opposition. In times when this threat of retribution abated, the famine-ridden communities showed more opposition to Moscow, both short and long-term. Thus, repression can both deter and inflame opposition, depending on the political opportunity structure in which post-repression behavior unfolds.

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“…These adaptation strategies suggest resilience in the civil society sector, which could offset the impact of restrictions. In a related vein, Finkel (2015) suggests that experiencing selective repression may help activists develop skills to withstand repression in the future.…”

Section: How Restrictions Influence Csos' Activitymentioning

confidence: 99%

Silencing Their Critics: How Government Restrictions Against Civil Society Affect International ‘Naming and Shaming’

Smidt

Perera

Mitchell

et al. 2020

Brit. J. Polit. Sci.

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International 'naming and shaming' campaigns rely on domestic civil society organizations (CSOs) for information on local human rights conditions. To stop this flow of information, some governments restrict CSOs, for example by limiting their access to funding. Do such restrictions reduce international naming and shaming campaigns that rely on information from domestic CSOs? This article argues that on the one hand, restrictions may reduce CSOs' ability and motives to monitor local abuses. On the other hand, these organizations may mobilize against restrictions and find new ways of delivering information on human rights violations to international publics. Using a cross-national dataset and in-depth evidence from Egypt, the study finds that low numbers of restrictions trigger shaming by international non-governmental organizations. Yet once governments impose multiple types of restrictions, it becomes harder for CSOs to adapt, resulting in fewer international shaming campaigns.'Naming and shaming' by international non-governmental organizations (INGOs) such as Amnesty International requires information on local human rights violations. 1 Civil society organizations (CSOs) that monitor government behavior locally provide this information (Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui 2005;Keck and Sikkink 1998;Krain 2012;Meernik et al. 2012;Risse, Ropp and Sikkink 1999;Risse, Ropp and Sikkink 2013). 2 In response, some governments have imposed an increasing number and variety of restrictions on CSOs operating in their territory, including funding restrictions, arbitrary arrests and travel obstructions (UN Human Rights Council 2016). But what impact do these restrictions have on international naming and shaming campaigns? We investigate this question by examining how government-imposed restrictions influence CSOs' ability and motivation to monitor, mobilize and report about human rights abuses and, subsequently, affect international shaming campaigns.We argue that government-imposed restrictions have a curvilinear effect on international shaming campaigns. CSOs can withstand or adapt to lower numbers of restrictions, which may motivate them to reach out to international allies and boost international shaming campaigns. However, as the number of types of restrictions on the organization and its staff increases, © Cambridge University Press 2020. 1 International naming and shaming efforts seek to bring attention to and condemn human rights abuses by specific governments. 2 We define CSOs as formal organizations that are not part of the government or the for-profit sector, and which monitor government behavior and advocate for social or policy change. CSOs include domestic organizations as well as local branches of international organizations, such as the local chapter of Amnesty International.

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The Phoenix Effect of State Repression: Jewish Resistance during the Holocaust

Cited by 94 publications

References 72 publications

The Death Camp Eldorado: Political and Economic Effects of Mass Violence

The Death Camp Eldorado: Political and Economic Effects of Mass Violence

Mass Repression and Political Loyalty: Evidence from Stalin’s ‘Terror by Hunger’

Silencing Their Critics: How Government Restrictions Against Civil Society Affect International ‘Naming and Shaming’

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