The physical salience of non-fundamental local beables

Abstract

I defend the idea that objects and events in three-dimensional space (so-called local beables) are part of the derivative ontology of quantum mechanics, rather than its fundamental ontology. The main objection to this idea stems from the question of how it can endow local beables with physical salience, as opposed to mere mathematical definability. I show that the responses to this objection in the previous literature are insufficient, and I provide the necessary arguments to render them successful. This includes demonstrating the legitimacy of dynamical considerations in the derivation of local beables and responding to the threat stemming from the availability of different sets of local beables in the context of the GRW theory.

Scientific realism and underdetermination in quantum theory

“…While the realist can appeal to plausibility considerations to rule out some of these (Esfeld, 2014), it is doubtful whether this forces a choice for a single option. For these and a number of further reasons, the explanatory advantages of introducing local beables as ontological primitives have been contested (Albert, 2015, chapter 7; Egg, 2017).…”

Quantum ontology without speculation

“…I wish to remain neutral on wider applications of such indispensability considerations, in particular with respect to the indispensability of mathematics. Therefore, my claim is only that indispensability responds to the kind of underdetermination worry that concerns us here, not that it is, in and of itself, a sufficient condition for realism.20 SeeEgg (2017) for a general defense of the idea that some local beables can be derived from the wave function.…”

“… 20 See Egg ( 2017 ) for a general defense of the idea that some local beables can be derived from the wave function. …”

A metaphilosophy of naturalism

“…For modest and immodest, direct and indirect defenses of (or flirtations with) spatiotemporalism, see Alexander (1920), Field (1984), Maudlin (2007), Esfeld and Lam (2008), Allori et al (2008;), Schaffer (2009b2010a;2010b;2010c;2015c), Ney (2012c), Esfeld (2013), Lam (2015), Allori (2016), and Lam and Wüthrich (forthcoming). For modest and immodest, direct and indirect attacks (or questionings) of spatiotemporalism, see Oriti (2014), Egg (2017), Le Bihan (2018), Singh (2018), Lam and Wüthrich (forthcoming), and Wüthrich (forthcoming). 420 Like Schneider (2017a), I do take the possibility of transcendent abstract objects to be a prima facie problem for physicalism.…”