The Physicalistic Trap in Perception Theory

Mausfeld, Rainer

doi:10.1002/0470013427.ch4

Cited by 32 publications

(31 citation statements)

References 47 publications

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“…It is us who are mistaken in our apprehension of the sensory perception." Similar insights have been expressed by, for example, Hering, Koffka, or Köhler (see Mausfeld, 2002Mausfeld, , 2010aMausfeld, , b, 2011, for references to the works cited). The pre-occupation with 'perceptual illusions,' which is still characteristic for large fields of perceptual psychology and philosophy of perception, indicates the extent to which perceptual research is still driven by commonsense conceptions of perception.…”

supporting

confidence: 62%

Notions such as “truth” or “correspondence to the objective world” play no role in explanatory accounts of perception

Mausfeld

2015

Psychon Bull Rev

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Hoffman, Singh, and Prakash (Psychonomic Review and Bulletin, 2015, in press) intend to show that perceptions are evolutionarily tuned to fitness rather than to truth. I argue, partly in accordance with their objective, that issues of 'truth' or 'veridicality' have no place in explanatory accounts of perception theory, and rather belong to either ordinary discourse or to philosophy. I regard, however, their general presumption that the evolutionary development of core achievements of the human perceptual system would be primarily determined by aspects of fitness and adaption as unwarranted in light of the evidence available.

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confidence: 62%

Notions such as “truth” or “correspondence to the objective world” play no role in explanatory accounts of perception

Mausfeld

2015

Psychon Bull Rev

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“…Perhaps the best way of illustrating the problem of perception and representation, as informed by the arts, is by focusing on Blinear^perspective and the aforementioned problem of capturing three-dimensional reality on a two-dimensional surface (Kandel, 2012;Mausfeld, 2002). The delineation of a Euclidean space allows three dimensions to be represented on a two dimensional surface (cf.…”

Section: Perception Perspective and Artmentioning

confidence: 99%

Rationality, Perception, and the All-Seeing Eye

2016

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Seeing-perception and vision-is implicitly the fundamental building block of the literature on rationality and cognition. Herbert Simon and Daniel Kahneman's arguments against the omniscience of economic agents-and the concept of bounded rationality-depend critically on a particular view of the nature of perception and vision. We propose that this framework of rationality merely replaces economic omniscience with perceptual omniscience. We show how the cognitive and social sciences feature a pervasive but problematic meta-assumption that is characterized by an Ball-seeing eye.^We raise concerns about this assumption and discuss different ways in which the all-seeing eye manifests itself in existing research on (bounded) rationality. We first consider the centrality of vision and perception in Simon's pioneering work. We then point to Kahneman's work-particularly his article BMaps of Bounded Rationality^-to illustrate the pervasiveness of an all-seeing view of perception, as manifested in the extensive use of visual examples and illusions. Similar assumptions about perception can be found across a large literature in the cognitive sciences. The central problem is the present emphasis on inverse optics-the objective nature of objects and environments, e.g., size, contrast, and color. This framework ignores the nature of the organism and perceiver. We argue instead that reality is constructed and expressed, and we discuss the species-specificity of perception, as well as perception as a user interface. We draw on vision science as well as the arts to develop an alternative understanding of rationality in the cognitive and social sciences. We conclude with a discussion of the implications of our arguments for the rationality and decision-making literature in cognitive psychology and behavioral economics, along with suggesting some ways forward.

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“…In the context of a natural science approach to perception, such a distinction is unwarranted and theoretically detrimental (cf. Mausfeld 2002). Yet it underlies almost all traditional accounts.…”

Section: The Attribute 'Real' In Explanatory Accounts Of Perceptionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Attribute of Realness and the Internal Organization of Perceptual Reality

Mausfeld

2013

Handbook of Experimental Phenomenology

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The chapter deals with the notion of phenomenal realness, which was first systematically explored by Albert Michotte. Phenomenal realness refers to the impression that a perceptual object is perceived to have an autonomous existence in our mind-independent world. Perceptual psychology provides an abundance of phenomena, ranging from amodal completion to picture perception, that indicate that phenomenal realness is an independent perceptual attribute that can be conferred to perceptual objects in different degrees. The chapter outlines a theoretical framework that appears particularly well-suited for dealing with corresponding phenomena. According to this framework, perception can be understood as a triggering of conceptual forms by sensor inputs. It is argued that the attribute of phenomenal realness is based on specific types of internal evaluation functions which deal with the segregation of causes conceived as 'external' from those conceived as 'internal'. These evaluation functions integrate different internal sources of 'knowledge' about the potential causes for the activation of conceptual forms and provide markers by which conceptual forms can be tagged as 'external world objects'.'Reality', in our ordinary usage of the term, denotes the entirety of things that actually exist. By 'reality' we mean the mind-independent world in which we are situated, about which our senses inform us and with which we can interact. In our ordinary modes of thinking, we regard all those aspects of our world as belonging or referring to reality, for which we have no reasons to assume that they are merely the product of mental activities, such as imagination, hallucination, or fiction. When we feel or think that our contact with reality becomes endangered due to other activities of our mind, such as imagination, dreaming, telling lies (i.e. contravening facts of reality), 'reality' itself becomes an object of our attention. The ways we deal with such situations suggest that we are equipped with intricate means to distinguish mind-internal productions from what we regard as mind-independent aspects of our world. The investigation of these means is a subject matter of perceptual psychology and, more generally, cognitive science. Notions of 'reality' and 'realness' can, of course, appear in other contexts different from perception theory, notably in ordinary discourse, theoretical physics, and philosophy. Fortunately, however, the specific issues that show up in these other contexts have no bearing (or only in a highly indirect way) on issues of perceptual psychology. Theoretical issues of perception theory that can be subsumed under the heading of 'phenomenal realness' are more easily recognisable when we do not confuse them with issues associated with 'realness' in other domains.

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The Physicalistic Trap in Perception Theory

Cited by 32 publications

References 47 publications

Notions such as “truth” or “correspondence to the objective world” play no role in explanatory accounts of perception

Notions such as “truth” or “correspondence to the objective world” play no role in explanatory accounts of perception

Rationality, Perception, and the All-Seeing Eye

The Attribute of Realness and the Internal Organization of Perceptual Reality

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