In the opinion of George Grote, writing in 1875, Plato's Athenian in the Laws 'recedes from the lofty pretensions of Socrates in the Republic and the Gorgias'. He does this, says Grote, in proclaiming as the fundamental characteristics of human nature: that no man will willingly do anything from which he does not anticipate more pleasure than pain: that every man desires the maximum of pleasure and the minimum of pain, and desires nothing else: that there neither is nor can be any Good apart from Pleasure or superior to Pleasure: that to insist upon a man being just, if you believe that he will obtain more pleasure or less pain from an unjust mode of life, is absurd and inconsistent: that the doctrine which declares the life of pleasure and the life of justice to lead in two distinct paths, is a heresy deserving not only censure but punishment. 1 The Athenian also recedes from the 'lofty pretensions' of the Republic and Gorgias in another point, says Grote. Socrates teaches in those dialogues that justice apart from its natural consequences will suffice per se to make the just man happy: 'per se, that is, even though. .. society misconceive his character and render no justice to him, but heap upon him nothing except obloquy and persecution'. 2 The Athenian recedes from this teaching altogether, continues Grote, and asserts instead the Epicurean doctrine that the just man 'is one who obtains from others that just dealing and that esteem which is his due: and when so conceived, his existence is one of pleasure and happiness'; 3 this, he adds, is the doctrine that Glaucon and Adeimantus in the Republic 'deprecate as unworthy disparagement of justice'. 4 In addition, though incidentally, Grote comments that the doctrine of the Laws 'about pleasure and good approximates more nearly to the Protagoras than to the Gorgias and Philebus', and this comment reinforces and adds interest to his other remarks, because he takes the hedonism of the Protagoras to be intended seriously, and he himself, a member of the circle of Bentham and James Mill, subscribes to its principal tenets. 5 By contrast, in the opinion of Wilamowitz, writing in 1917, Plato has nothing of philosophical interest to say in the Laws, even Aristotle merely thumbing through it as undeserving of closer scrutiny. 6