The place of words and numbers in psychiatric research

Abstract

In recent decades, there has been widespread debate in the human and social sciences regarding the compatibility and the relative merits of quantitative and qualitative approaches in research. In psychiatry, depending on disciplines and traditions, objects of study can be represented either in words or using two types of mathematization. In the latter case, the use of mathematics in psychiatry is most often only local, as opposed to global as in the case of classical mechanics. Relationships between these objects of study can in turn be explored in three different ways: 1/ by a hermeneutic process, 2/ using statistics, the most frequent method in psychiatric research today, 3/ using equations, i.e. using mathematical relationships that are formal and deterministic. The 3 ways of representing entities (with language, locally with mathematics or globally with mathematics) and the 3 ways of expressing the relationships between entities (using hermeneutics, statistics or equations) can be combined in a cross-tabulation, and nearly all nine combinations can be described using examples. A typology of this nature may be useful in assessing which epistemological perspectives are currently dominant in a constantly evolving field such as psychiatry, and which other perspectives still need to be developed. It also contributes to undermining the overly simplistic and counterproductive beliefs that accompany the assumption of a Manichean “quantitative/qualitative” dichotomy. Systematic examination of this set of typologies could be useful in indicating new directions for future research beyond the quantitative/qualitative divide.

Measurement, ontology, and epistemology: Psychology needs pragmatism-realism

“…With the pragmatist approach, we look for arguments that might show that the practical conditions of a quantitative measure are met: undimensionality and density, in particular. This approach is close to the warranted assertability proposed by Dewey (1994) as the modus operandi of falsifiability, in a discursive approach to the necessary justification, as discussed by Falissard, Révah, Yang, and Fagot-Largeault (2013) on the subject of quantitative models in psychiatry. As these authors argue, considerable weight is given to the results of statistical procedures in the validation or refutation process, which is generally justified by the fact that they provide formal, universal, and deterministic arguments.…”

Text mining applications in psychiatry: a systematic literature review

“…In conclusion, at a time when there is a debate on the relative merits of qualitative and quantitative methods in psychiatric research (Falissard et al ., ), TM offers an original approach. Exploratory by nature, processing free speech or texts obtained from patients or physicians, it is in many ways close to qualitative methods.…”

Quantification in Experimental Psychology and Pragmatic Epistemology: Tension Between the Scientific Imperative and the Social Imperative

“…The statistical model represents the theory in mathematical representation, but there is no equivalence between the two. From the statistical model to the theory, there is the addition of “meaning,” that is to say that we move from a mathematical formalism to the substantive theory ( Falissard et al, 2013 ). In addition, when a statistical model is considered validated, there is no statistical method to consider that it correctly models the operationalized objects because of the potential effects of confounding variables or the problem of equivalent models (models with the same statistical validity but with very different theoretical meanings).…”