The Policy and Conduct of Sultan Mahmud Ii

Finlay, George; Tozer, H. F.

doi:10.1017/cbo9781107444515.008

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“…Over a thousand 'philhellenes', Italians, French, English, Scots, Irish, Germans, Swiss, Poles, Scandinavians, Americans, Spaniards, Portuguese, Dutch, Hungarians and others (but not Russians, much to Capodistrias's chagrin 53 ) came to assist the Greeks in their struggle, including a unique celebrity, Lord Byron, with some of his greatest romantic poems referring to the Greek cause (Childe Harold, Don Juan and others). 54 The philhellenes were convinced of the righteousness of the Greek cause and of the barbarity of the 'Turks'. Thus the atrocities and other barbarous acts committed by the Greeks -the few that were reported -were wished away and had little impact in stemming the enthusiasm.…”

Section: The Philhellenesmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Canning replied (in December 1824) reiterating British neutrality but hinted that Britain might mediate in the future and would not be party to an agreement unacceptable to the Greeks. 73 Meanwhile, a unique event was to create a sensation, reviving the waning international public interest in the Greek cause. Byron, the idol of literary Europe and America, had arrived in Messolonghi in January 1824, inspiring romantic Byronists across Europe to join him.…”

Section: Canning Russia Byronmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…His death assured the Greek cause thereafter of constant European concern, which was much needed in view of the arrival of Ibrahim and his forces early the next year. 78…”

Section: Canning Russia Byronmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Cochrane and Church, together with Blanquière and Hamilton, were instrumental in convincing the rival Greeks factions (and even the pro-British Mavrokordatos) that the wisest option was to nominate Capodistrias as President. 126 The ambassadors of the three powers, Stratford, Ribeaupierre and Guilleminot (France), tried to convince Foreign Minister Pertev-Effendi to accept a cease-fire and mediation, and on 12 August 1827 gave only fourteen days to the Porte to come up with an answer. On the fourteenth day the reaction of the Porte was negative.…”

Section: The St Petersburg Protocol and Its Aftermathmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The outcome is well known: the annihilation of the Egyptian and Ottoman fleets. 135 Navarino, the last major naval battle fought under sail, in eighteenth-century battle conditions, has passed into legend, not least in the lore of humanitarian intervention. Navarino is retrospectively regarded as the first instance of use of force for humanitarian purposes as we understand it today, 136 but a sound case could be made that its humanitarian rationale is unconvincing.…”

Section: Navarino and Its Aftermathmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Intervention in the Greek War of Independence, 1821–32

Heraclides¹,

Dialla²

2017

Humanitarian Intervention in the Long Nineteenth Century

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On intervention The intervention of Britain, Russia and France in the Greek War of Independence is regarded as the first armed intervention on humanitarian grounds in world history (as depicted by publicists from Wheaton onwards) and it took place prior to the appearance of the new concept of humanitarian intervention. As such it was pace-setting. From the Congress of Vienna (1814-15) until the outbreak of the Greek War of Independence, there were three views on intervention at the diplomatic level. Metternich and his close adviser Friedrich Gentz held that the great powers could take counter-revolutionary measures and intervene to suppress uprisings against legitimate rule. 1 This doctrine was shared by Tsar Alexander I, and his brainchild, the Holy Alliance (Russia, Austria and Prussia), and was endorsed by the great power Congress system at the Congresses of Aix La Chapelle (November 1818) and Troppau (November 1820). 2 The second view came from Britain's Foreign Secretary, Castlereagh, who stated in a famous circular (dated 19 January 1821) that states retained the right to interfere 'where their own immediate security or essential interest are seriously endangered by the internal transactions of another State' and not as 'a general and indiscriminate application to all revolutionary movements'. 3 The third approach was peaceful involvement, mainly mediation attempts. This can be discerned in the foreign policy initiatives of the two main rivals of Metternich on the European scene, Ioannis Capodistrias 4 (co-Foreign Minister of Russia, with Nesselrode) and George Canning as British Foreign Secretary. 5 A major concern (then and now) was finding the most propitious international reaction in instances of protracted internal wars. One approach was the cordon sanitaire, the sealing off of a country experiencing civil war and thus avoiding getting into a messy situation, with unpredictable results. 6 But absolute noninvolvement or an arms embargo could inadvertently amount to supporting the militarily more powerful party in an internal conflict (as seen in the 1990s with the Bosnian tragedy). To remember the famous Talleyrand adage: 'non-intervention

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Section: The Philhellenesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Canning Russia Byronmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…His death assured the Greek cause thereafter of constant European concern, which was much needed in view of the arrival of Ibrahim and his forces early the next year. 78…”

Section: Canning Russia Byronmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: The St Petersburg Protocol and Its Aftermathmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Navarino and Its Aftermathmentioning

confidence: 99%

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