The policy implementation strategies of county cadres: Political instrument and flexible local governance

Abstract

Using the concept of ‘hedging’, we explore how local cadres in China deviate from central policies in order to serve local interests and, while doing so, avoid being called to account by their superiors. Political signals enable cadres to decide when to invest more resources into the implementation of certain policies. In this way, they optimize their performance and avoid the political risks involved in failing to carry out their designated tasks. This article uses county Y as an example in a discussion of county-level implementation of policies related to economic growth and air pollution control. We find that local cadres weaken the functions of the superior ‘special inspection team’ (专项督察组, hereafter inspection team), treating them as political instruments used by the central and local authorities to ensure a greater level of responsiveness at the grass roots. Information concerning the imminent arrival of an inspection team in their locality acts as a signal for cadres to allocate more resources to the enforcement of air pollution control measures, thus maximizing their performance in this area. Through this research, we have endeavoured to provide a deeper understanding of the operating logic of Chinese local governments and the behaviour of county cadres.

Carbon emission rush in response to the carbon reduction policy in China

“…19 Other academics have used the concept of hedging to explain such local failure. 20 Jie Gao developed a typology of pernicious and benign gaming and characterized this as the manipulation of performance indicators to achieve central targets on paper while sacrificing the public interest. 21 Such central-local implementation gaps cast doubt on the efficacy of an authoritarian system.…”