The Policy-Making of Investment Treaties in Brazil: Policy Learning in the Context of Late Adoption

Maggetti, Martino; Moraes, Henrique Choer

doi:10.1007/978-3-319-76210-4_13

Cited by 6 publications

(5 citation statements)

References 14 publications

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“…Concerning the traditional BITs, which Brazil did not sign before 1994, 12 Escobar (1996, p. 91) mentions that "one of the most prominent features of these and of all recent investment treaties (of Brazil, authors) is their provision for the settlement of disputes between covered investors and the host state by means of binding international arbitration". 13 Regarding conflict resolution enshrined in these agreements, it is worth noting that the BITs of the early stages have shifted from SSDS to state-private entity dispute resolution (Maggetti and Moraes 2018). 14 Between 1994 and 1999, Brazil signed 14 traditional BITs.…”

Section: The Early Stage-1994-1999mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The Energy Charter Treaty provides a multilateral framework for energy cooperation that is unique under international law (see Energy Charter Treaty-Energy Charter). 7 Also see, e.g., Fritz (2015), Martins (2017), andMonebhurrun (2017), as well as Maggetti andMoraes (2018, p. 313) andCavallo (2019, p. 70) referring to statements made by Brazilian officials. Investor-State disputes are solved in different fora, and the most important is the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID).…”

Section: Conflicts Of Interestmentioning

confidence: 99%

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The (Political) Economics of Bilateral Investment Treaties—The Unique Trajectory of Brazil

Bellak,

Leibrecht

2024

Economies

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Brazil, after signing several traditional Bilateral Investment Treaties without ratifying them, recently shifted towards a different type of bilateral investment agreement, i.e., Investment Cooperation and Facilitation Agreements. Two claims have been made in the literature regarding the transition from traditional Bilateral Investment Treaties to Investment Cooperation and Facilitation Agreements—Claim #1: The non-ratification of the traditional BITs has not harmed Foreign Direct Investment into Brazil, a claim which puts into question the purpose of Bilateral Investment Treaties. Claim #2: While Investment Cooperation and Facilitation Agreements avoid some of the problems of traditional Bilateral Investment Treaties, on balance they are less effective than traditional Bilateral Investment Treaties would have been. We examine the two claims from an empirical economic point of view. We build on the literature about Brazil’s position vis-à-vis Bilateral Investment Treaties, which must be viewed by an amalgamation of (i) a historical legacy; (ii) domestic initiatives, and (iii) a particular U-turn in the political debate. Using empirical evidence on Foreign Direct Investment effects of Bilateral Investment Treaties, the following conclusions emerge: With regard to claim #1, empirical evidence in general as well as specific to Brazil suggests that Brazil has forgone Foreign Direct Investment by not ratifying traditional Bilateral Investment Treaties. Concerning claim #2, while Investment Cooperation and Facilitation Agreements include alternative dispute settlement mechanisms, which aim at a better compliance of states with the Investment Cooperation and Facilitation Agreements’ rules, rather than the compensation of foreign investors, the lower stringency of the State–State dispute settlement mechanism compared to Investor–State dispute settlement mechanism makes Investment Cooperation and Facilitation Agreements less effective. Yet, this weakening effect must be weighed against the effects on Foreign Direct Investment from innovative clauses in Investment Cooperation and Facilitation Agreements, which are absent in many traditional Bilateral Investment Treaties.

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Section: The Early Stage-1994-1999mentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Conflicts Of Interestmentioning

confidence: 99%

The (Political) Economics of Bilateral Investment Treaties—The Unique Trajectory of Brazil

Bellak,

Leibrecht

2024

Economies

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“…Both NUTS and LAU overlap in principle with existing regional administrative units but they serve specific purposes only. Another example of this mechanism concerns countries that seek to establish multi‐ or bilateral preferential trade agreements in the shadow of the GATT/WTO such as Mercosur (Mansfield and Reinhardt ; Maggetti and Choer‐Moraes ), which also involve reconfiguration to task‐specific competencies.…”

Section: Self‐reinforcing Dynamics Of Delegation In Multilevel Policymentioning

confidence: 99%

Multilevel governance and problem‐solving: Towards a dynamic theory of multilevel policy‐making?

Maggetti

Trein

2019

Public Administration

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In this article, we suggest that the governance of problems shapes the institutional dynamics of multilevel governance (MLG) polities. MLG arrangements—processes and institutions that enable policy‐making across different jurisdictional levels wherein both public authorities and non‐state actors are involved—can or cannot succeed in solving policy problems and at the same time they could create new problems. We argue that the problem‐solving capacity and problem‐generating potential of multilevel arrangements can result in further, downwards, upwards or sideways delegation of political authority, which in turn reconfigure the multilevel architecture of the political system following either centripetal or centrifugal tendencies. We illustrate our point with a stylized account of the dynamics of MLG in the European Union (EU) since the early 1990s. We conclude with some remarks about developing a more general theory of multilevel policy‐making.

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“…The articles in this symposium start from the EU as the prototypical case of multilevel governance and then embark on a comparative analysis of different articulations of the relationship between multilevelness and problem‐solving in other contexts. The settings analysed in this symposium vary in terms of the functional differentiation of the respective multilevel governance system (Maggetti and Choer Moraes ; Tosun and Hartung ), such as federal states (Heidbreder et al ) and international organizations (IO) (Ege ). This comparative approach allows for a wide‐ranging investigation into the challenges of problem‐solving in multilevel governance settings.…”

Section: Introduction and Rationale For The Symposiummentioning

confidence: 99%

Integration, functional differentiation and problem‐solving in multilevel governance

Trein

Thomann

Maggetti

2019

Public Administration

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The European Union (EU) is currently facing unprecedented challenges to its problem‐solving capacity, such as those represented by pressing transnational crises and by bottom‐up criticisms towards the European integration process. Moreover, the EU is said to compensate its weak input legitimacy with an enhanced problem‐solving capacity. However, the notion of problem‐solving itself has remained remarkably vague in the multilevel governance (MLG) literature. This symposium analyses problem‐solving in different MLG settings. In this introduction, we identify procedural and operational notions of problem‐solving in MLG, and present a structural framework to guide the comparative analyses of multilevel systems along the dimensions of political integration, functional differentiation and decentralization. The contributions to the symposium illustrate how structural elements of different multilevel systems shape both the policy‐making process and the politics of problem‐solving within these systems. In doing so, they pave the way for further comparative research.

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The Policy-Making of Investment Treaties in Brazil: Policy Learning in the Context of Late Adoption

Cited by 6 publications

References 14 publications

The (Political) Economics of Bilateral Investment Treaties—The Unique Trajectory of Brazil

The (Political) Economics of Bilateral Investment Treaties—The Unique Trajectory of Brazil

Multilevel governance and problem‐solving: Towards a dynamic theory of multilevel policy‐making?

Integration, functional differentiation and problem‐solving in multilevel governance

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